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A LIE FOR A LIE: FALSE CONFESSIONS AND
THE CASE FOR RECONSIDERING THE
LEGALITY OF DECEPTIVE INTERROGATION
TECHNIQUES
Miriam S. Gohara*
“History amply shows that confessions have often been extorted to save
law enforcement officials the trouble and effort of obtaining valid and
independent evidence.” 1
“The principle that a State may not knowingly use false evidence . . . to
obtain a tainted conviction [is] implicit in any concept of ordered
liberty.” 2

I. INTRODUCTION
The December 2002 exoneration of five young men who were convicted
of the infamous 1989 attack on a jogger in Central Park highlighted the
ease with which standard interrogation techniques can produce false
confessions that lead to wrongful convictions. 3
When the jogger was attacked in 1989, the public was convinced that the
five Harlem youths, who repeatedly incriminated themselves and each
other, were guilty beyond doubt. Meanwhile, the actual attacker committed
* Assistant Director, Criminal Justice Project, NAACP Legal Defense and
Educational Fund, Inc.; B.A., Columbia 1994; J.D., Harvard 1997. This article is dedicated
to the memory of Prof. Welsh White who painstakingly reviewed several drafts and was
immeasurably generous with his expertise and feedback. I also owe an enormous debt of
gratitude to Tanya Coke for her review and edits and to Dan Korobkin for substantial
research assistance. Many thanks also to Maria Pulzetti and Jessica Zertuche for additional
research assistance.
1. Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 519 (1963).
2. Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959).
3. See, e.g., Susan Saulny, Convictions and Charges Voided in ’89 Central Park
Jogger Attack, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 2002, at A1. For a more detailed discussion of the
jogger case, see Steven A. Drizin & Richard A. Leo, The Problem of False Confessions in
the Post-DNA World, 82 N.C. L. REV. 891, 894-900 (2004); N. Jeremi Duru, The Central
Park Five, The Scottsboro Boys, and the Myth of the Bestial Black Man, 25 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1315, 1346-60 (2004).

101

GOHARA_CHRISTENSEN

102

2/3/2011 10:18 PM

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

[Vol. XXXIII

three more rapes and a rape and murder before he was caught. 4 In 2002,
when the case unraveled after the actual perpetrator confessed to attacking
the victim by himself, the public scratched its collective head while trying
to understand why not only one, but several, of the boys had apparently
falsely confessed to their involvement in the brutal attack on the jogger.
A significant part of the answer may be attributable to the courtapproved interrogation techniques that police have been using for decades
in station houses across the country. Principal among these is the routine
deception of suspects about a range of issues which influence a suspect’s
willingness to make an incriminating statement. In the Central Park jogger
case, family members of the five exonerated youths have alleged that the
police tricked the boys into believing that they were simply giving
statements as witnesses, not as suspects, and that once they provided taped
interviews, they would be allowed to go home. 5 In addition, the
interrogation tactic of leading each boy to believe that others had already
confessed and implicated the others was particularly effective. 6 For
example, Kharey Wise, one of the exonerated five youths, said he initially
told police he knew nothing about the jogger. But when police told him
that his friends had said that he was at the scene, “he started making up
facts ‘just to give them what they wanted to hear.’” 7 Wise said that the
police told him he would be able to go home after giving his statement, but
instead they took him to jail. In his words, “‘I fell for it.’” 8 Other
deceptive tactics were also employed. One detective even admitted to
falsely telling one of the suspects that his fingerprints would be found on
the jogger’s shorts. 9
The case of Martin Tankleff presents another high profile example of the
pitfalls of police trickery on youthful and other vulnerable suspects.
Tankleff was seventeen years old when his parents were discovered
stabbed to death in their Long Island home. 10 Tankleff, who had been
asleep in the house at the time his parents were killed, immediately became
4. See Jim Dwyer, Amid Focus on Youths in Jogger Case, a Rapist’s Attacks
Continued, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 2002, at B1.
5. See House of Cards: Experts Say Interrogation Techniques Can Encourage False
Confessions (ABC News broadcast Sept. 26, 2002).
6. See id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. See Drizin & Leo, supra note 3, at 897 & n.20 (citing THOMAS MCKENNA,
MANHATTAN NORTH HOMICIDE 11 (1991) (authored by Detective Thomas McKenna, who
investigated the Jogger case)).
10. Bruce Lambert, Long Jailed In Killings, Son Tells of Ordeal; Fighting Conviction in
Parents’ Murder with Focus on New Evidence, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 2004, at A43
[hereinafter Lambert, Long Jailed in Killings, Son Tells of Ordeal].
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the prime suspect. 11 During the interrogation, the lead detective, by his
own admission, told Tankleff untruthfully that his father had awakened at
the hospital and identified him as the attacker.12 Tankleff told the police
that his father had never lied to him and that if he identified him as the
attacker, maybe he had “blacked out” and in fact killed his parents. 13 The
police agreed with Tankleff that he had probably committed the crime but
blocked the memory. Tankleff then provided a possible narrative of the
crime but was unable to provide any details of the crime apart from
information detectives had presented during his interrogation.14 The
detective penned a confession based on this narrative which Tankleff
refused to sign and immediately disavowed. 15 The statement contained
details of the crime which were irreconcilable with the physical evidence.16
Nevertheless, the statement was admitted at Tankleff’s trial and became the
centerpiece of the case against him. Though he remains incarcerated for
the crime, post-conviction investigation has revealed strong evidence
pointing to his father’s business partner, Jerry Steuerman, as the likely
culprit. 17 The police never investigated Steuerman, despite the fact that he
had a motive to murder the victims—he owed them hundreds of thousands
of dollars and had been arguing with them about this shortly before they
died—and despite the fact that he staged his own suicide shortly after the
Tankleff murders. 18 Police explained their failure to investigate Steuerman

11. Id. at A48.
12. Id. The detective also misrepresented a number of other facts during Tankleff’s
interrogation. He told Tankleff that his hair was found in his mother’s hands and that a test
proved that he had used his shower after his parents’ murder, and speculated that he had
done so in order to wash off their blood. See Bruce Lambert, Awaiting Next Word in 17Year-Old Murder Case, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 3, 2006, at B1.
13. See John Springer, New Evidence Gives Hope to Long Island Man Convicted of
Killing Parents (Court T.V. broadcast July 20, 2004).
14. See Richard A. Leo & Richard J. Ofshe, The Consequences of False Confessions:
Deprivations of Liberty and Miscarriages of Justice in the Age of Psychological
Interrogation, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 429, 458 (1998) [hereinafter Leo & Ofshe,
The Consequences of False Confessions]; see also Lambert, Long Jailed In Killings, Son
Tells of Ordeal supra note 10, at A48.
15. Lambert, Long Jailed In Killings, Son Tells of Ordeal, supra note 10, at A48.
16. For example, even though the bodies showed signs of a struggle, no blood or tissue
were found under Tankleff’s fingernails and his own body exhibited no bruises or scratches.
The murder weapons identified in the statement, a knife and a barbell, were found in the
home without a trace of blood. Id.; see also Leo & Ofshe, The Consequences of False
Confessions, supra note 14, at 458.
17. Lambert, Long Jailed in Killings, Son Tells of Ordeal, supra note 10, at 48; Bruce
Lambert, Youth Says Father Admitted to ‘88 Long Island Murders, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14,
2005, at B6 (reporting that Joseph Creedon, an alleged accomplice of Steuerman’s,
implicated himself and Steuerman in the Tankleff murder).
18. Lambert, Long Jailed in Killings, Son Tells of Ordeal, supra note 10, at 48.
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by saying that they “were confident they had solved the case with [Martin]
Tankleff’s arrest.” 19 Several witnesses have since come forward and
admitted that associates of Mr. Steuerman recruited them to attack the
Tankleffs. 20 Martin Tankleff’s motion for a new trial was denied by the
trial court in Suffolk County, New York. 21
Courts have repeatedly held that police are free to mislead suspects
about everything from the existence of physical evidence against them, to
the results of polygraphs, to the statements of alleged cohorts incriminating
them in the crime. The bedrock cases sanctioning police deception,
however, pre-date the advent of DNA testing and the many exonerations
that followed from DNA test results. 22 As the Central Park Jogger and
Tankleff cases demonstrate, interrogation practices in which police
misrepresent evidence against suspects can and do lead to false confessions
and wrongful convictions. Examination of actual wrongful convictions and
additional empirical data demonstrating the correlation between deceptive
interrogation practices and false confessions provide a basis for
reconsidering the line of cases that allow police to use trickery to obtain
confessions. Such reconsideration is particularly critical because at the
time those cases were decided, it was assumed that deceptive interrogations
would not lead to false confessions.
This article reviews the law on deceptive interrogation practices,
discusses empirical evidence of the role police deception plays in eliciting
false confessions and argues that the law should circumscribe interrogation
techniques that rely on misrepresentation to induce suspects into
incriminating themselves. 23 This article also asserts that there are good
policy reasons, in addition to the increasing exposure of wrongful
convictions, which should encourage courts and legislators to proscribe the
use of deception by law enforcement in a criminal justice system expressly
designed to elicit the truth about a crime. 24
19. Id.
20. See id.; Springer, supra note 13.
21. Bruce Lambert, Verdict Upheld in 1998 Killings of L.I. Couple, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
18, 2006, at B1.
22. For a more detailed description of the advent of wrongful conviction research, and
the impact of DNA on the study of false confessions specifically, see Drizin & Leo, supra
note 3; see also Samuel R. Gross et al., Exonerations in the United States 1989 Through
2003, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 523, 527 (2005) (“The rate of exonerations has
increased sharply over the fifteen year period of this study, from an average of twelve a year
[through the early 1990s] to an average of forty-two a year since 2000.”).
23. See also Welsh S. White, Miranda’s Failure To Restrain Pernicious Interrogation
Practices, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1211, 1246-47 (2001) [hereinafter White, Miranda’s Failure]
(arguing police deception may induce false confessions).
24. See Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959); Pyle v. Kansas, 317 U.S. 213 (1942);

GOHARA_CHRISTENSEN

2006]

2/3/2011 10:18 PM

A LIE FOR A LIE

105

Numerous articles have described the phenomenon of false confessions
and some have examined the factors which cause people to implicate
themselves in crimes they did not commit. 25 Little has been written to date,
however, about the specific impact on the reliability of confessions of
standard interrogation techniques including trickery and deception of
suspects. Moreover, despite increasing numbers of wrongful convictions
that have resulted from demonstrably false confessions, criminal justice
reforms aimed at protecting the innocent have missed the opportunity to
reconsider laws which allow police to trick suspects about a wide variety of
subjects, including the strength and availability of incriminating evidence,
in order to induce a confession. 26 This article provides data and policy
arguments in favor of adopting reforms of standard interrogation tactics in
which police mislead suspects about evidence and other factors which
suspects weigh heavily before deciding whether to incriminate themselves.
The article also proposes novel, specific reforms limiting the use of
standard interrogation techniques and recommends challenges to
confessions begotten from interrogations employing trickery.
Part II reviews the case law affirming the use of deceptive law
enforcement interrogations. In pre-Miranda cases, the Supreme Court
recognized that in some circumstances, trickery during interrogations was
coercive and rendered confessions inadmissible.27 In post-Miranda cases,
however, the Court has applied a “totality of the circumstances” test and
indicated that, so long as the police comply with Miranda, statements
obtained through deceptive interrogation practices will almost invariably be
admissible. 28 So as the law stands today, trickery which does not deprive a
suspect of his Miranda rights, does not by itself invalidate a confession.
Part III describes and then critiques deceptive police techniques
recommended in leading law enforcement training manuals. After
describing these techniques, Part III examines empirical data bearing on
whether these techniques are likely to produce reliable statements. Part IV
argues that in light of the growing body of empirical evidence
demonstrating that law enforcement trickery plays a significant role in false
confessions, defense lawyers should challenge confessions made after
interrogations involving police trickery, courts should circumscribe
Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935); see also Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court for the Dist.
of Columbia, 542 U.S. 367, 384 (2004) (noting that executive privilege claims that shield
evidence from disclosure to the grand jury or at trial may not be expansively construed
because “they are in derogation of the search for truth”) (internal citation omitted).
25. See infra section III.B.
26. See infra section IV.A
27
28

See infra notes 31-41.
See infra notes 42-73.
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interrogation techniques which employ lies to induce a suspect to confess,
and legislatures should regulate or proscribe those deceptive interrogation
techniques—such as false evidence ploys—which have proven most likely
to elicit false confessions.29
II. REVIEW OF UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT AND LOWER COURT
CASES CONSIDERING THE LEGALITY OF DECEPTIVE LAW
ENFORCEMENT INTERROGATION TECHNIQUES
Prior to its 1966 decision in Miranda v. Arizona, 30 the Supreme Court,
applying a due process voluntariness test, recognized, in several cases, that
the police use of deceptive interrogation tactics played a significant role in
producing involuntary confessions. 31 In Leyra v. Denno, 32 Leyra asked the
police to allow him to see a physician because he was suffering from sinus
problems. 33 The police brought in a psychiatrist who posed as a general
physician. The Supreme Court held that the “subtle and suggestive”
questioning by the psychiatrist amounted to a continued interrogation of the

29. False evidence ploys and other overt forms of deception are certainly not the only
type of deceptive interrogation practices. As psychologist Saul Kassin has written, the
“minimization” technique prescribed by leading interrogation manuals, allows police to
refrain from explicitly promising a suspect lenience in exchange for a confession—a
practice which would render the confession inadmissible in court—but still allows the
interrogator to suggest implicitly that the confession will ameliorate the consequences of the
suspect’s having incriminated himself. See Saul M. Kassin, On the Psychology of
Confessions: Does Innocence Put Innocents at Risk?, 60 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 215, 222
(2005) [hereinafter Kassin, Does Innocence Put Innocents at Risk?] (“[I]t is now clear
that . . . [minimization] circumvents the exclusion of promise-elicited leniency ‘under the
radar.’”); see also infra notes 92-111 and accompanying text (discussing the minimization
technique in more detail).
30. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
31. Under the “due process voluntariness test,” courts evaluated the admissibility of a
suspect’s statement by determining under the totality of the circumstances whether the
statement was voluntary, i.e., “the product of a rational intellect and a free will.” Blackburn
v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 208 (1960). See White, Miranda’s Failure, supra note 23, at
1215-17 (discussing the “minimal safeguards” against pernicious interrogation tactics that
Miranda’s core protections have actually afforded suspects); see also Mark A. Godsey,
Rethinking the Involuntary Confession Rule: Toward a Workable Test for Identifying
Compelled Self-Incrimination, 93 CAL. L. REV. 465 (2005) (tracing the history of confession
law before and after Miranda and advocating for a departure from Miranda’s focus on
subjective “voluntariness” under the Fifth Amendment’s due process clause and instead
adopting an “objective penalties test” under the self-incrimination clause, which would
render inadmissible confessions compelled by the use of certain defined “objective
penalties”); id. at 540 (“This test would hold any confession inadmissible when it has been
obtained by imposing an objective penalty [defined within the article based on a review of
relevant law] on the suspect under interrogation to provoke speech or punish silence.”).
32. 347 U.S. 556 (1954).
33. Id. at 559.
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suspect without his knowledge. 34 This deception and other circumstances
of the interrogation rendered Leyra’s confession involuntary. 35 Similarly,
in Spano v. New York, 36 the Court considered a case in which the suspect
regarded one of the interrogating officers to be a friend. The Court held
that the officer’s false statements, which suggested that the suspect’s
actions might cost the officer his job, were a key factor in rendering the
confession involuntary. 37
Even where the defendant fell short of establishing that the police
actually lied to him, in the pre-Miranda era, the Court was willing to
consider the coercive effect of deceptive interrogation techniques. For
example, in Lynumn v. Illinois, 38 the Court held that police threats to
remove a suspect’s children and the government aid she received to support
them, overbore her will and coerced her confession, because she was not
familiar enough with the legal system to know whether the police actually
had the authority to carry out their threats. 39
In an oft-quoted phrase from Miranda, the Supreme Court
acknowledged the potentially coercive effect of obtaining confessions
through police trickery and intimidation: “As a practical matter, the
compulsion to speak in the isolated setting of the police station may well be
greater than in courts or other official investigations, where there are often
impartial observers to guard against intimidation or trickery.” 40 The Court
indicated that the deceptive tactics recommended by standard interrogation
manuals fostered the coercive environment of police interrogation.41

34

Id.at 561.

35. Id.
36. 360 U.S. 315 (1959).
37. Id. at 323.
38. 372 U.S. 528 (1963).
39. Id. at 534; see also Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 491 (1964) (holding that the
suspect’s right to counsel had been violated where the interrogating officers obtained the
suspect’s incriminating statement by tricking him into believing that his alleged accomplice
had incriminated him, and noting that counsel is particularly critical when “the police carry
out a process of interrogations that lends itself to eliciting incriminating statements”).
40. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 461 (1966). Shortly after Miranda was decided,
critics cited concerns that the procedures it requires actually obscure, rather than elucidate,
the truth in criminal trials. Cf. Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 707-708 (1993)
(O’Connor, J., dissenting in part); Miranda, 384 U.S. at 542 (White, J., dissenting)
(objecting that the Court’s holding in Miranda “establish[ed] a new . . . barrier to the
ascertainment of truth by the judicial process”); see also Godsey, supra, note 31, at 508-09
(describing contemporaneous criticisms of Miranda).
41. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 457.
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A. Trickery in the Post-Miranda era
Following Miranda, which established that a suspect’s custodial
statements cannot be used against him unless police apprise the suspect of
his rights to remain silent and to counsel, the Supreme Court precedent
concerning interrogation trickery changed direction almost immediately.
Three years after Miranda, in Frazier v. Cupp, 42 the Court undermined the
suggestion that confessions obtained through trickery may be coercive.
Frazier held that the voluntariness of a confession induced by police
trickery must be evaluated under a “totality of the circumstances” test. 43 In
Frazier, police used two forms of trickery to extract a statement from the
suspect. First, they told Frazier that another man whom Frazier and the
victim had been seen with on the night of the crime had confessed to
involvement in the crime. 44 The investigating detective also suggested,
sympathetically, that Frazier had started a fight with the victim because the
victim made homosexual advances toward him. 45 The Court held that
Frazier’s confession was voluntary, and cited only the officers’ false
statements regarding the co-defendant’s confession as trickery. 46 It did not
consider the feigned sympathy about the homosexual advance as such.47
Frazier established that police deception itself would not be enough, on its
own, to render a confession involuntary. Rather, according to Frazier,
police deception is one factor among many that a court should consider in
evaluating the voluntariness of a suspect’s incriminating statements. 48
The evolution to a “totality of the circumstances” test suggests that once
42. 394 U.S. 731 (1969).
43. Id. at 739.
44. Id. at 737.
45. Id. at 738.
46. Id. at 739.
47. Id.
48. Id. A couple of additional Supreme Court cases have addressed police trickery
directly. In Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 432-34 (1986), the Court held that police
deception of an attorney, whom a suspect’s family had contacted to represent him, did not
render the suspect’s three instances of waiver of his Miranda rights and subsequent
confession involuntary. The attorney had attempted to contact the suspect by calling the
police station. Id. at 417. Police told the attorney that the suspect would be questioned the
following day, and never notified the suspect that the attorney had tried to contact him. Id.
The suspect then waived his rights and gave the incriminating statements. Id.
In a 1984 decision, New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984), the Court held that a
statement police obtained without Mirandizing a suspect, and the gun to which the statement
led the authorities, were admissible pursuant to the “public safety” exception to Miranda.
Id. at 655-56. In dissent, Justice Marshall, joined by Justices Brennan and Stevens, asserted
that in order to avert a potential public emergency, police may “of course” resort to coercion
and trickery to reveal life-saving information, but that the Fifth Amendment prohibited the
admissibility of such statements at trial. Id. at 686 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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the Court established the Miranda safeguards, it was willing to allow police
leeway to use interrogation tactics which had previously been considered
coercive. 49 This result is evinced by the scores of federal decisions
recognizing exceptions to Miranda’s admonition that deceptive
interrogation tactics may compromise a confession’s voluntariness,
especially in cases where Miranda warnings have been administered. 50
In 2004, the Court established that when interrogation tactics deprive a
suspect of an adequate understanding of her Miranda rights, they render the
resulting incriminating statements involuntary. Missouri v. Seibert 51
involved the interrogation of Patrice Seibert for an arson which resulted in
the death of a teenager. 52 The officer who interrogated her had been
instructed to refrain from giving Seibert Miranda warnings. 53 At the police
station, the officer left Seibert alone in the interrogation room for twenty
minutes and then interrogated her for thirty to forty minutes, all without
Mirandizing her. 54 After Seibert admitted that she intended for the
teenager to die in the fire, the officer gave her a twenty-minute coffee and
cigarette break. 55 The officer returned, turned on a tape recorder and gave
Seibert the Miranda warning. 56 She signed a waiver of rights, and the
officer resumed the interrogation, starting by confronting Seibert with her
pre-Miranda admissions. 57 Seibert, who was later charged with firstdegree murder, sought to exclude both her pre-warning and post-warning
statements. 58 At the suppression hearing, the officer who interrogated
Seibert testified that he made a “conscious decision” not to Mirandize her
at the outset. He acknowledged that he acted pursuant to an interrogation
49. See Frazier, 394 U.S. at 739.
50. See White, Miranda’s Failure, supra note 23, at 1220
Two factors have contributed to the infrequency with which lower courts find due
process violations in post-[Miranda] waiver confession cases. First, lower courts
conflate the test for determining a valid Miranda waiver with the test for
determining a voluntary confession because the tests are so similar. Both tests
require the court to assess the ‘totality of [the] circumstances’ to determine
whether the suspect’s action was voluntary. . . Second, the Supreme Court’s
limited application of the voluntariness test during the post-Miranda era has
probably increased lower courts’ natural inclination to disfavor involuntary
confession claims.
Id.
51. 542 U.S. 600 (2004).
52. Id. at 604-05.
53. Id. at 604.
54. Id. at 604-05.
55. Id. at 605.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
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technique whereby officers are instructed to withhold the warnings,
question the suspects, then give the warnings, repeat the questions, and use
He further
the suspects’ pre-warning statements against them. 59
acknowledged that Seibert’s post-Miranda statement was repetitive of her
pre-warning statements. 60 She was convicted of second-degree murder.61
On direct appeal, the Missouri Supreme Court reversed Seibert’s
conviction on the grounds that her post-Miranda statements were the
product of her “invalid first statement” and should have been suppressed at
trial. 62 The United States Supreme Court affirmed and held that the
Miranda warnings administered to Seibert were delivered “midinterrogation” and were therefore ineffective in protecting her Fifth
Amendment rights. 63 In reaching this conclusion, the Court gave great
weight to the fact that the officer’s questioning of Seibert was “systematic,
exhaustive, and managed with psychological skill.” 64 This coupled with
the facts that: the first and second interrogations were conducted by the
same officer; both interrogations took place in the same station house; a
mere fifteen to twenty minutes lapsed between the two interrogations; and
the officer repeatedly made reference to the first interrogation during the
second, rendered it “reasonable to regard the two sessions as part of a
continuum,” and thereby nullified the effect of the Miranda warning
delivered between Seibert’s two statements.65
Although Seibert lays groundwork for some limits on deliberately
deceptive interrogation tactics,66 the case fell short of establishing clearly

59. Id. at 609-10. The court noted:
An officer of [the Rolla, Missouri] police department testified [at Seibert’s
suppression hearing] that the strategy of withholding Miranda warnings until after
interrogating and drawing out a confession was promoted not only by his own
department, but by a national police training organization and other departments
in which he had worked . . . Consistently with the officer’s testimony, the Police
Law Institute, for example, instructs that ‘officers may conduct a two-stage
interrogation . . . At any point during the pre-Miranda interrogation, usually after
arrestees have confessed, officers may then read the Miranda warnings and ask
for a waiver. If the arrestees waive their Miranda rights, officers will be able to
repeat any subsequent incriminating statements later in court.’
Id. (quoting POLICE LAW INST., IL. POLICE LAW MANUAL 83 (Jan. 2001-Dec. 2003)
(emphasis in original) ).
60. Id. at 606.
61. Id.
62. Id. (citing Missouri v. Seibert, 93 S.W.3d 700, 701 (2002)).
63. Id. at 617.
64. See id. at 616.
65. See id. at 616-17.
66. Note that Seibert reinforces the post-Miranda trend that an interrogation practice
which undermines Miranda will likely render a confession involuntary, but that once
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discernible standards for assessing when trickery renders a confession
involuntary. Moreover, Seibert only directly applies to cases involving the
deliberate withholding of Miranda warnings. It makes no explicit
statement about the use of other sorts of deception, in some instances
blatant untruths, used to trick suspects into confessing in cases where they
have been Mirandized legitimately. In other words, the Court refrained
from seizing the occasion to affirm the principles established in its Leyra,
Spano, and the other pre-Miranda cases which recognized that under some
circumstances deliberately lying to a suspect during interrogation per se
nullified statements obtained therefrom. 67
The federal courts of appeals have applied and expanded on the Supreme
Court’s tolerance of deceptive police practices to induce confessions.
Several circuit court decisions have held confessions to be voluntary where
police have misrepresented the existence of physical evidence linking the
suspect to the crime; 68 where they have fabricated statements of

Miranda is invoked, police are granted wide berth in employing deceptive interrogation
techniques. In fact, Justice Kennedy concurred in the judgment on a narrower ground: that
there must be a finding that the police intentionally employed a tactic designed to undermine
Miranda warnings before a statement should be considered involuntary. Id. at 621-22
(Kennedy, J., concurring).
67. See supra notes 27-34 and accompanying text.
68. See United States v. Byram, 145 F.3d 405, 408 (1st Cir. 1998)
[T]rickery is not automatically coercion. Indeed, the police commonly engage in
such ruses as suggesting to a suspect that a confederate has just confessed or that
police have or will secure physical evidence against the suspect. While the line
between ruse and coercion is sometimes blurred, confessions procured by deceits
have been held voluntary in a number of situations.
Id.; Ledbetter v. Edwards, 35 F.3d 1062, 1070-71 (6th Cir. 1994) (holding that under the
totality of the circumstances, use of phony evidence including picture of fingerprint
misrepresented as being from crime scene, telling suspect he had been identified in photo
array, and creating a staged scene where a police officer acting as the victim “identified” the
suspect through glass in the police station did not render the confession involuntary, and
noting that it was obtained by “means of legitimate law-enforcement methods that withstand
constitutional scrutiny”); see also Lucero v. Kerby, 133 F.3d 1299, 1311 (10th Cir. 1998)
(finding confessions voluntary where police falsely informed the defendant that his
fingerprints had been found at the victim’s home; “misrepresentations, without more, do not
render an otherwise voluntary confession involuntary”); United States v. Welch, No. 934043, 1994 U.S. App Lexis 26574, at *6 (6th Cir. Sept. 19, 1994) (finding that an officer’s
telling the defendant that “new DNA test[ing]” had shown that her daughter had not died of
Sudden Infant Death Syndrome and that strong circumstantial evidence linked the defendant
to the girls’ deaths did not render her confession involuntary); Green v. Scully, 850 F.2d
894, 903-04 (2d Cir. 1988) (finding that confession was voluntary despite police
“‘chicanery’” of falsely telling the defendant that his fingerprints matched prints taken off
blood in the victims’ apartment); Sotelo v. Ind. State Prison, 850 F.2d 1244, 1251-52 (7th
Cir. 1988) (finding confession voluntary where police, inter alia, falsely told the suspect
that the results of a polygraph indicated that he was lying about his innocence, which along
with other tactics induced his confession).
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accomplices implicating the suspect being questioned; 69 where they have
made false promises of leniency; 70 where they have misrepresented the
intention to prosecute or the seriousness of the charges against the
suspect; 71 where police have falsely promised the suspect psychiatric help
69. See United States v. Velasquez, 885 F.2d 1076, 1088-89 (3d Cir. 1989) (deciding
that a confession was voluntary although detectives falsely informed the suspect that her
alleged accomplice had been released after making statements against her and these false
statements made the government’s evidence look much stronger than it actually was);
United States v. Petary, 857 F.2d 458, 461 (8th Cir. 1988) (citing Frazier v. Cupp and
holding that under the totality of the circumstances, interrogating a suspect for six to seven
hours who had not slept for twenty-four hours, had consumed beer but no food, and telling
him that his alleged accomplice was talking to agents was not coercive); United States v.
Castaneda-Castaneda, 729 F.2d 1360, 1363 (11th Cir. 1984) (finding the confessions of
husband and wife co-defendants voluntary after police falsely told the husband the wife had
confessed, he confessed, and then they returned to the wife with the husband’s statements
and she also confessed); see also Schmidt v. Hewitt, 573 F.2d 794, 801 (3d Cir. 1978)
(remanding to the trial court for a hearing on voluntariness after officers falsely told the
suspect his accomplices had confessed and interrogated him for five days without allowing
him to see his mother); cf. Nelson v. Fulcomer, 911 F.2d 928, 940-41 (3d Cir. 1990)
(remanding for further fact finding where, after invoking his Fifth Amendment right to
remain silent, the suspect was confronted with his alleged accomplice, the two had a
conversation in which the accomplice said he admitted to the crime, and the suspect made
inculpatory remarks; the court noted that if the police had falsely told the suspect that the
accomplice had confessed before placing them in the room together, such tactic would be
prohibited as a ploy likely to induce a confession, pursuant to Rhode Island v. Innis, 446
U.S. 291, 299 (1980), but that if the accomplice was simply placed in the room without
more, the confession would not meet the test of being reasonably likely to elicit an
incriminating response).
70. See United States v. Flemmi, 225 F.3d 78, 91 & n.5 (1st Cir. 2000) (finding that a
confession was voluntary when given in response to a promise of immunity from an FBI
agent without authority to grant immunity) (“The mere fact that an unfulfilled promise was
made in exchange for a person’s statement does not constitute coercion . . . . Of course
trickery can sink to the level of coercion, but this is a relatively rare phenomenon.”); United
States v. Rojas-Martinez, 968 F.2d 415, 418 (5th Cir. 1992) (finding implicit promises to let
suspects return to Mexico insufficient to render confessions involuntary); United States v.
Harris, 914 F.2d 927, 933 (7th Cir. 1990) (“[I]t is well settled that police may use small
deceptions while interrogating witnesses . . . [and] police are free to solicit confessions by
offering to reduce the charges against the defendant.”); cf. United States v. Powe, 591 F.2d
833, 836 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (“[I]t is firmly established that self-incriminating statements
induced by promises or offers of leniency shall be regarded as involuntary and shall not be
admitted into evidence for any purpose.”).
71. See United States v. Haynes, No. 00-4675, 2001 WL 1459702 at *8 (4th Cir. Nov.
19, 2001) (finding a confession voluntary where police staged a room to give the impression
that a “massive investigation” of the defendant for a triple homicide was ongoing, though
the defendant had been arrested on charges of cocaine distribution); see also Byram, 145
F.3d at 408 (holding that the suspect’s statements were voluntary where police gave him
false assurances that he would not be prosecuted); United States v. Matthews, 942 F.2d 779,
782 (10th Cir. 1991) (finding the suspect’s statements voluntary where he was led to believe
that if he cooperated, no charges would be brought against him); Miller v. Fenton, 796 F.2d
598, 609-10 (3d Cir. 1986) (finding the confession voluntary although police lied about the
victim’s status, though she was dead, the officer represented at the beginning of the
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in exchange for a statement; 72 and where they have misled the suspect
about the strength of the evidence against him. 73
B. Impermissible Trickery
A few courts have circumscribed deceptive interrogation practices that
they have considered extreme in some way. 74 Some have also suggested
that any interrogation practices likely to result in false confessions are
impermissible. 75 For example, at least two state courts have made a
distinction between verbal misrepresentations and fabricated tangible
evidence and have held that the boundaries of deceptive interrogation
techniques must be drawn at the latter. In State v. Cayward, 76 a Florida
appeals court held that the fabrication of scientific reports implicating a
suspect and the presentation thereof to the suspect during his interrogation
rendered his confession invalid.
The court cited several policy
justifications for its holding:
In addition to our spontaneous distaste for the conduct we have reviewed
in this matter, we have practical concerns regarding use of false reports
beyond the inducement of a confession. Unlike oral misrepresentations,
manufactured documents have the potential of indefinite life and the
interview that she was alive and told the suspect “you are not a criminal”); cf. Hart v.
Attorney Gen. of Fl., 323 F.3d 884, 894-95 (11th Cir. 2003) (holding that the suspect’s
confession was involuntary given the totality of the circumstances surrounding the
interrogation where a police officer whom the suspect “trusted” told him that the “cons” of
having an attorney present were that the attorney would tell him not to answer the officer’s
questions; on the grounds that such misleading information rendered the suspect’s waiver of
his Miranda rights involuntary).
72. See Green, 850 F.2d at 903 (holding that confession was uncoerced where
detectives, inter alia, promised to obtain psychiatric help for suspect); Miller, 796 F.2d at
610 (same); Jarrell v. Balkcom, 735 F.2d 1242, 1250 (11th Cir. 1984) (rejecting petitioner’s
argument that his confession was involuntary because police officer said that as far as he
knew petitioner/suspect would receive medical help for his mental condition); cf. United
States v. Raymer, 876 F.2d 383, 386-87 (5th Cir. 1989) (“Police exploitation of the mental
condition of a suspect, using ‘subtle forms of psychological persuasion,’ could render a
confession involuntary,” but did not in the instant case) (internal citation omitted).
73. See, e.g., Holland v. McGinnis, 963 F.2d 1044, 1050-51 (7th Cir. 1992) (finding the
defendant’s first confession, which followed kicking, beating, punching, and pulling hair by
police involuntary, but finding second confession, which took place in another police station
under questioning by different officers six hours later, voluntary, even though the second
group of officers falsely represented that a witness had seen the suspect at the crime scene).
74. See State v. Thacker, No. W2002-01119-CCA-R3-DD, 2003 Tenn. Crim. App.
LEXIS 1133, at *83 (Tenn Crim. App. Dec. 18, 2003) (quoting State v. Stephenson, 878
S.W.2d 530, 544 (Tenn. 1994)); cf. Lara v. State, 25 P.3d 507, 510 (Wyo. 2001).
75. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Baity, 237 A.2d 172, 177 (Pa. 1968) (“[A] trick which
has no tendency to produce a false confession is a permissible weapon in the interrogator’s
arsenal.”) (citing Commonwealth v. Spardute, 122 A.161, 164 (Pa. 1923)).
76. 552 So. 2d 971, 974-75 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
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facial appearance of authenticity. A report falsified for interrogation
purposes might well be retained and filed in police paperwork. Such
reports have the potential of finding their way into the courtroom. 77

The Superior Court of New Jersey cited Cayward extensively in State v.
Patton. 78 In Patton, the defendant challenged his confession in part on the
grounds that it was induced after police fabricated an audiotape of an
eyewitness who claimed to have seen the defendant perpetrate the crime.79
The New Jersey trial court admitted the tape, which also contained a
“roadmap” of the prosecution’s theory of the crime and hearsay evidence of
prior bad acts by the defendant. The appeals court ordered a new trial and
held that the fabricated evidence “set in motion a confluence of events that
tainted not only the interrogation process but the trial itself.” 80 The court
went on to note that the “totality of the circumstances” test is “not without
limits” and held Patton’s confession per se involuntary as a result of the
fabricated evidence.81 The court even went as far as equating the use of
fabricated evidence with physical coercion during interrogation. 82
Few federal courts have circumscribed the use of specific deceptive
interrogation techniques, and only in rare cases have federal courts deemed
deceptive interrogation practices coercive. The federal courts generally
apply a “totality of the circumstances” test, which is discussed in more
detail, infra, in determining whether a confession is voluntary. 83 In
applying the “totality” test, courts have considered all the circumstances
surrounding a confession and have stopped short of issuing per se bars on
particular deceptive tactics.
Deception, false assurances, and misrepresentations of the availability of
independent incriminating evidence by themselves are generally
insufficient to establish involuntariness under the federal courts’
application of the “totality” test. 84 Rather, federal courts’ central inquiry
77. See also id. (listing concerns that opening the door for fabricated evidence may lead
to the fabrication of warrants and other court documents and that sanctioning such
fabrication by law enforcement would damage the rapport police have established with the
general public).
78. 826 A.2d 783 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2003).
79. Id. at 789.
80. Id. at 800.
81. Id. at 802.
82. Id. at 805.
83. See, e.g., United States v. Bell, 367 F.3d 452, 461 (5th Cir. 2004); United States v.
Crawford, 372 F.3d 1048, 1060 (9th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1057 (2005).
84. See, e.g., Bell, 367 F.3d at 461-62 (holding that interrogators’ false statements that
the suspect would go to jail if he lied to them and that police had physical evidence
connecting the suspect to a rape did not render his confession involuntary because in this
case, the deception had not overcome the suspect’s will); Crawford, 372 F.3d at 1060
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into the impact of a particular interrogation tactic on voluntariness is
whether the allegedly coercive tactic overcame the suspect’s free will and
rational decision-making. 85
Despite the general paucity of federal caselaw circumscribing deceptive
interrogation techniques, there are a few noteworthy federal decisions
sanctioning the use of particular tactics. The Seventh Circuit, for example,
held, in the context of a Fourth Amendment consent-to-search claim, that
“[a]lthough the law permits the police to pressure and cajole, conceal
material facts, and actively mislead, it draws the line at outright fraud, as
where police extract a confession in exchange for a false promise to set the
defendant free.” 86 In so holding, the court drew explicit parallels between
law enforcement deception in executing a search and in extracting a
confession. 87 The Ninth Circuit held that when detectives coerced a
suspect into confessing by falsely telling him that his statement could not
be used against him, the resultant statement was involuntary. 88
Interrogations employing false or fabricated evidence where
interrogators have misled suspects to believe that police possessed
inculpatory evidence, including physical evidence or accomplices’
confessions have generally been held to be voluntary. 89 At least one
(internal citations omitted) (“Trickery, deceit, even impersonation do not render a
confession inadmissible, certainly in noncustodial situations and usually in custodial ones as
well, unless government agents make threats or promises.”); Monroe v. Coplan, No. Civ.
02-069B, 2002 WL 31689343 at *5 (D.N.H. Nov. 22, 2002). (“Misrepresentation to a
defendant of the strength of the government’s case is not per se coercive, although it is a
factor to be considered in the ‘totality of the circumstances’ surrounding a confession.”).
85. See Bell, 372 F.3d at 462; United States v. Haswood, 350 F.3d 1024, 1029 (9th Cir.
2003)”; Pollard v. Galaza, 290 F.3d 1030, 1033-34 (9th Cir. 2002) (determining that a
confession was voluntary in light of the “surrounding circumstances and the combined
effect of the entire course of the officer’s conduct upon the defendant” and holding that
“misrepresentations made by law enforcement . . . while reprehensible, does [sic] not
necessarily constitute coercive conduct”); see also Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 165
(1986).
86. Hadley v. Williams, 368 F.3d 747, 749 (7th Cir. 2004) (internal citations omitted)
(holding that the defendant’s mother’s consent to enter and search her home to arrest her
son, after police misrepresentation that they had a warrant for his arrest, was obtained
fraudulently, and that the search was therefore a Fourth Amendment violation); cf. United
States v. Rucker, 348 F. Supp. 2d 981, 1003 (S.D. Ind. 2004) (applying the “totality” test to
determine the voluntariness of a suspect’s consent to search, and finding that law
enforcement deceit about prior entry into the suspect’s apartment did not overcome
voluntariness in the absence of threats or promises).
87. Hadley, 368 F.3d at 749.
88. Henry v. Kernan, 197 F.3d 1021, 1027 (9th Cir. 1999) (“[T]he slippery and illegal
tactics of the detectives overcame Henry’s will and . . . he continued his confession only as a
result of their deception.”).
89. See United States v. Lux, 905 F.2d 1379, 1382 (10th Cir. 1990) (upholding as
voluntary a confession made after police falsely told the suspect that her co-defendant had
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federal court, however, has held that a confession obtained after police
presented fabricated evidence, like that employed in Cayward, was
involuntary. 90
Cayward and its progeny represent an admirable effort by courts to set
some limits on the use of deliberate deception to induce suspects to
confess. 91 The policies underlying these holdings, and reasons that other

implicated her in the murder); Coplan, 2002 WL 31689343 at *7 (concluding that a
confession was voluntary when it was obtained by an undercover officer posing as a witness
to the crime who blackmailed the suspect by promising not to report him to authorities in
exchange for $2,000 payment from the suspect); Dallio v. Spitzer, 170 F. Supp. 2d 327, 340
(E.D.N.Y. 2001) ), aff’d, 343 F.3d 553 (2d Cir. 2003) (denying habeas relief and finding
that the confession was voluntary because the officer did not lie to the suspect, but merely
asked what would happen if he were to tell the suspect that his fingerprints were found in
blood at the murder scene); U.S. ex rel. Brandon v. LaVallee, 391 F. Supp. 1150, 1152
(S.D.N.Y. 1974) (same). But see Quartararo v. Mantello, 715 F. Supp. 449, 460-61
(E.D.N.Y. 1989), aff’d, 888 F.2d 126 (2d Cir. 1989) (finding involuntary the confession of a
fifteen-year-old boy whom police had questioned for four hours without counsel or family
members present and falsely reported that his alleged accomplice had confessed to the
homicide and “buried” the suspect).
90. Robinson v. Smith, 451 F. Supp. 1278, 1291-92 (W.D.N.Y. 1978) (finding that the
police told the suspect that his accomplice had accused him of shooting the victim, had
presented the suspect with a typed, fabricated confession “signed” by the accomplice, and
had misled the suspect that the only way he could avoid “having a rope put around his neck”
was by acknowledging his role and clearing himself of the shooting, though the crime was a
felony murder and charges would be brought against both accomplices regardless of who
did the shooting).
91. Cf. State v. Farley, 452 S.E.2d 50, 60 n.13 (W.Va. 1994) (citing State v. Cayward,
552 So. 2d 971, 974 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989), with approval and opining that if the police
in the instant case had fabricated a false polygraph report, the defendant’s confession would
have been inadmissible); State v. Kelekolio, 849 P.2d 58, 73 (Haw. 1993). The court in
Kelekolio drew a distinction between deliberate falsehoods that are “intrinsic” to the facts of
the offense and falsehoods which are “extrinsic” to those facts and held that the intrinsic
deception will be considered among the totality of the circumstances while the extrinsic
deception, which is more likely to produce a false confession, will be per se inadmissible.
Id. According to the court, examples of intrinsic falsehoods include: misrepresentations
regarding the existence of incriminating evidence, a claim that a murder victim is still alive,
discovery of a non-existent witness; examples of extrinsic falsehoods include: assurances of
divine salvation upon confession, promises of mental health treatment in exchange for a
confession, promises of favorable treatment in exchange for a confession,
misrepresentations of legal principles. Id. See also United States v. Swint, 15 F.3d 286, 290
(3d Cir. 1994) (holding that the government overreached, rendering a confession
involuntary, by misleading the defendant about the implications of his statements); Woods
v. Clusen, 794 F.2d 293, 297 (7th Cir. 1986) (holding that under the totality of the
circumstances the police overreached when they falsely reported to a juvenile suspect that
his fingerprints had been found on the victim’s wallet, showed him gruesome photos of the
crime scene, forced him to wear jail garb, and subjected him to intimidating statements);
Singletary v. Fischer, 365 F. Supp. 2d 328, 337-38 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (finding defense
counsel ineffective for failing to challenge the validity of a confession obtained after police
tricked a mentally retarded defendant by promising him leniency and drug treatment if he
would make incriminating statements implicating himself in his niece’s murder); United
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courts should follow and extend them, are further discussed in Part IV. The
cases limiting the use of certain deceptive interrogation techniques may lay
the foundation for some of the reforms proposed in Part IV. In fact, the
leading interrogation manual, described in the next section, cites Cayward
and admonishes officers not to fabricate evidence. Nevertheless, as the law
currently stands, a defendant seeking to suppress his confession on the sole
grounds that the police induced it by tricking him faces bleak prospects of
succeeding in court.
III. DECEPTIVE INTERROGATION TECHNIQUES AND THE ROLE THEY
PLAY IN ELICITING FALSE CONFESSIONS
A. Review of Interrogation Manuals Prescribing Tricking and
Deceiving Suspects 92
The interrogation method most widely publicized and probably most
widely used is known as the Reid Technique, which was introduced in the
interrogation manual Criminal Interrogation and Confessions (“Inabu
Manual”) 93 and was commercialized by John E. Reid and Associates,
States v. Knowles, 2 F. Supp. 2d 1135, 1137 (E.D. Wis. 1998) (holding that a “pattern of
deceptions” amounted to coercion during interrogation); Quartararo, 715 F. Supp. at 460
(E.D.N.Y. 1989) (invalidating a confession given after the interrogating officer untruthfully
told the defendant, that a co-defendant had confessed and offered the defendant leniency to
confess as well); Robinson v. Smith, 451 F. Supp. 1278, 1292 (W.D.N.Y. 1978); Pyles v.
State, 947 S.W.2d 754, 756-57 (Ark. 1997) (excluding a confession based on an officer’s
“false promise” that he would help the defendant if he incriminated himself); Mason v.
Texas, 116 S.W.3d 248, 260 (Tex. App. 2003) (listing the factors which render confessions
induced by a promise involuntary and inadmissible). But see, e.g., U.S. ex rel. Lathan v.
Deegan, 450 F.2d 181, 185 (2d Cir. 1971) (upholding a confession where a detective posed
as an Army officer who wanted to help the defendant); Whittington v. State, 809 A.2d 721,
741 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2002) (upholding a confession where the police used fake
gunpowder to make the suspect believe that a test had shown that she had gunpowder on her
hand); People v. Henry, 132 A.D.2d 673, 675 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987) (upholding a
confession elicited after the defendant was confronted with a fabricated polygraph test
indicating that he had lied to police).
92. This article’s review of interrogation manuals concentrates on the leading
interrogation manual, FRED E. INBAU ET AL., CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS
(Jones & Bartlett Pubs. 2004) (1962) [hereinafter INBAU MANUAL], and presents a sampling
of three other noteworthy and influential interrogation manuals as well. This is by no means
a comprehensive review of all interrogation manuals to which American law enforcement
agencies may have referred historically or today.
93. See id. The first edition, published in 1962, was repeatedly cited and implicitly
criticized in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 449-54 (1966). Professor Yale Kamisar also
subjected the first edition to a stinging critique. See Yale Kamisar, What Is an
“Involuntary” Confession? Some Comments on Inbau and Reid’s Criminal Interrogation
and Confessions, 17 RUTGERS L. REV. 728 (1963), reprinted in YALE KAMISAR, POLICE
INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS: ESSAYS IN LAW AND POLICY 1 (1980). Second and Third
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Inc. 94 The distinctive features of the Reid Technique are: (1) a sharp
distinction between an interview and an interrogation; 95 (2) the accusatory
nature of the interrogation; 96 (3) the premise that a suspect will not easily
confess because to do so is against his interests; 97 (4) and a psychologically
sophisticated array of methods and procedures by which an interrogator can
nevertheless elicit a confession.98
The Reid technique is founded on the premise that a suspect will not
confess unless he is led to believe that doing so is in his own best interest.
Reid prescribes a nine-step approach for law enforcement officers to
employ in order to convince suspects that confessing is in their selfinterest. 99 Pursuant to Reid’s technique, convincing a suspect that
incriminating himself will inure to his benefit requires both persuading the
suspect that the benefits of confession are relatively high (e.g. internal
peace, more lenient punishment, end of interrogation) and that the costs of
confession are relatively low (e.g. futility of continued denial, possibility
that the crime was morally justified).100
Throughout its description of interrogation tactics, the Inabu Manual

Editions were issued in 1967 and 1986, respectively. Most modern references are to the
Third Edition, and presumably most law enforcement agencies rely primarily upon that text.
A Fourth Edition, however, was released in 2004, and references herein, except when
otherwise specified, are to the Fourth Edition.
94. See John E. Reid & Associates, Inc., http://www.reid.com (last visited February 3,
2006).
95. INBAU MANUAL, supra note 92, at 5.
96. Id. at 213.
97. Id. at 419.
98. Id. at 209-398.
99. Id. at 419 (“Ordinary people do not act against self-interest without at least a
temporary perception of a positive gain in doing so.”); see also id. at 212-16 (summarizing
techniques).
100. GISLI H. GUDJONSSON, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTERROGATIONS, CONFESSIONS AND
TESTIMONY 62 (1992) (“According to the [Reid] model, a suspect confesses (i.e. tells the
truth) when the perceived consequences of a confession are more desirable than the anxiety
generated by the deception (i.e. denial).”); Steven A. Drizin & Richard A. Leo, The Problem
of False Confessions in the Post-DNA World, 82 N.C. L. REV. 891, 913 (2004)
Drawing on more than fifty years of theoretical and empirical research on rational
choice approaches to decision-making, both in social psychology and
microeconomics, the Decision-Making Model [of Confession] . . . focuses on how
the interrogator’s efforts at persuasion influence a suspect’s perception and
analysis of his immediate situation, the options available to him, and the likely
consequences of each possible course of action. According to this model, the
interrogator’s goal is to persuade the suspect that the act of admission is in his
self-interest and therefore the most rational course of action, just as the act of
continued denial is against his self-interest and therefore the least rational course
of action.
Id.
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makes it clear that employing trickery and deceit is essential to an
interrogator’s strategy for eliciting a confession. The use of false evidence
ploys, in particular, are cited as helpful in convincing the suspect that his
refusal to confess would be fruitless because overwhelming independent
incriminating evidence is more than sufficient to obtain a conviction. 101 In
Step 1, the interrogator is advised to accuse the suspect with great
confidence. 102 The Inabu Manual notes that the accusation will have a
greater impact if the interrogator is accompanied by a thick case file as well
as visual props such as video tapes, a fingerprint card, shell casings, and
plastic evidence bags. 103 The interrogator need not refer specifically to
these items; the visual reference will often be enough. 104 In Step 2, the
Inabu Manual draws a distinction between the “emotional” and the “nonemotional” suspect: the emotional suspect will respond positively to themes
that empathize with the suspect’s discomfort and minimize his moral
culpability for the criminal act, whereas the non-emotional suspect will
respond positively to a rational presentation of his circumstances and his
possible courses of action. 105 Thus, the non-emotional suspect will be
more likely to respond favorably to the techniques used to disarm the
emotional suspect—expressions of empathy and minimizations of moral
culpability—after it is made clear to him that his denials are futile and that
101. See Brian C. Jayne & Joseph P. Buckley III, Criminal Interrogation Techniques on
Trial, SECURITY MGMT., Oct. 1992, at 64, in which the authors advise interrogators
“[f]alsely [to] tell the suspect about possible evidence implicating him or her in the
commission of the crime.”); see also LAWRENCE S. WRIGHTSMAN & SAUL M. KASSIN,
CONFESSIONS IN THE COURTROOM 77 (1993)
The interrogator could thus pretend to have strong circumstantial evidence (e.g.,
the suspect’s fingerprints at the scene of the crime), have a policeman pose as an
eyewitness and identify the suspect in a rigged line-up, or even—through
elaborate staging devices—try to persuade the suspect that he or she has already
been implicated by an accomplice or co-suspect.
Welsh S. White, False Confessions and the Constitution: Safeguards Against Untrustworthy
Confessions, 32 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 105, 146 (1997) [hereinafter White, False
Confessions] (“When the interrogator tells the suspect that there is convincing evidence of
his guilt, the suspect may feel that maintaining his innocence will be futile.”).
102. INBAU MANUAL, supra note 92, at 218-19.
103. Id. at 217 (noting that “in fact, the file may contain nothing but blank sheets of
paper”); see also id. at 219 (suggesting that during the initial confrontation the interrogator
“finger through the case folder to create the impression that it contains material of an
incriminating nature about the suspect”). Inbau is careful to advise the interrogator against
“prepar[ing] false incriminating documents that appear to have been generated through an
official source” such as the FBI or a crime lab. Id. at 217 n.2 (citing State v. Cayward, 552
So.2d 971 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989)) and stating that the Cayward decision was based on
the risk that “such falsified documents may find their way into the court system”). This
footnote is new for the Fourth Edition.
104. Id. at 217.
105. Id. at 209-10.
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the police need not rely on his confession in light of independent
incriminating evidence.106 In Step 3, the interrogator may continue to use
the false evidence ploy in order to quickly reject persistent denials by the
suspect. 107 The Inabu Manual recommends additional deceptive ploys
such as “playing one [suspect] against the other” by leading one to believe
the other has confessed, even when no such thing has taken place. 108 For
example, the Inabu Manual describes a scenario whereby a police
department secretary pretends to be typing up a suspect’s confession while
the other suspect watches. 109 The officer then delivers the “confession” to
the suspect who allegedly confessed and spends a few moments with him,
leading the other to believe that his alleged cohort is signing his own
statement. 110 All of this is a ruse. The officer then interrogates the suspect
who did not “confess” and leads him to believe, without revealing the
content of his cohort’s statement, that his accomplice implicated both of
them in the offense. 111
The authors of the Inabu Manual assert strongly, particularly in the
Fourth Edition, that their techniques do not elicit false confessions. They
support this in two ways. First, they instruct the interrogator on how to
differentiate the truth-telling, innocent suspect from the lying, guilty
suspect. 112 Thus, the deceptive interrogation techniques will be used only
106. Id. at 290-91.
107. Id. at 306-07.
108. Id. at 2932-93.
109. Id. at 294-95.
110. Id. at 295.
111. Id. The manual offers several additional suggestions for using “bluffs” to pit
suspects against one another. See id. at 295-98.
112. See id. at 107-08 (listing “Indications of Truthfulness” and “Indications of
Deception”); id. at 121-53 (describing “Behavior Symptom Analysis”); id. at 213 (claiming
that a guilty person will permit the interrogator to cut off his denials, whereas an innocent
person will continue to deny the accusation even when the interrogator attempts to cut him
off); id. at 213-14 (claiming that a guilty person will fall back on economic, religious, or
moral reasons to explain why he could not have committed the crime of which he is
accused, whereas an innocent person will continue to insist upon his factual innocence and
not fall back on such objections); id. at 222-23 (describing the “Behavioral Pause,” in which
immediately following an initial confrontation with the interrogator the guilty person will
avoid eye contact, shift uncomfortably, cross his legs, lean back in his chair, and ask
questions to stall for time, whereas the innocent person will become angry, lean forward in
his chair, look the interrogator in the eye, and vehemently deny the accusation); id. at 314
(claiming that “[b]y far, the easiest denials to identify during an interrogation are those
emanating from an innocent suspect”). But see id. at 155 (“Although behavior symptoms
can be helpful in differentiating truth from deception, they are not to be considered
determinative of the issue.”); id. at 155-71 (noting behavior common to truthful and lying
suspects and warning of factors that can lead to misinterpretation of behavior symptoms); id.
at 226 (warning that there are “exceptions” to the general rule that a guilty person will react
to accusations “in a passive, evasive, and insincere manner” whereas an innocent person
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on suspects whom the interrogator has determined are guilty. Second, they
insist that if a completely innocent person were subjected to the Reid
Technique, it would not produce a false confession.113
Particularly noteworthy are the authors’ defenses of trickery, deception,
and the use of false evidence. 114 As described infra, the Inabu Manual
discourages the use of false evidence in some instances. 115 As a legal
matter, the Inabu Manual notes that a confession could be excluded from
evidence if it appears to be a result of threats or promises. 116 And as a
tactical matter, it warns that the use of false evidence may backfire if the
suspect realizes he is being deceived and becomes irreversibly
uncooperative. 117 But the authors of the Inabu Manual steadfastly maintain
that the tactics they recommend cannot cause an innocent person to
confess. 118 Instead, they suggest that deceptive tactics, if employed
properly, can actually assist law enforcement in determining whether the
suspect is in fact guilty. 119 The Inabu Manual further recommends the use
of a bait question—for instance, “Is there any reason why we would find
will react “in a sincere, aggressive, and perhaps even hostile manner”).
113. Id. at 212 (“It must be remembered that none of the [Nine] steps is apt to make an
innocent person confess and that all the steps are legally as well as morally justifiable.”); id.
at 290 (“[A]n innocent suspect . . . is not apt to confess to a crime merely because the
investigator expresses high confidence in his guilt . . . .”).
114. See id. at 236, 291, 323, 427-29.
115. See infra note 193 and accompanying text.
116. Id. at 236 (warning that if the interrogator tells the suspect that “the case against him
is iron clad,” then the only issue to resolve is the length of sentence the suspect will receive,
leading the interrogator to imply that a confession will result in leniency). The authors
indicate that the best way to get around this legal obstacle is to tell a suspect that the
evidence against him is so strong that his confession isn’t necessary, but that he is being
offered an opportunity to tell his side of the story. Id. at 291. This is legally distinct, the
Inbau Manual, insists, from telling suspects that the evidence is so strong they are certain to
be convicted and a confession is the best way to get a lighter sentence. Id. at 290.
117. Id. at 323 (“While it is perfectly legal to verbally lie about evidence connecting a
suspect to a crime, it is a risky technique to employ. . . . A miscalculation . . . may cause the
technique to backfire and fortify a guilty suspect’s resistance.”); id. at 429 (“Introducing
fictitious evidence during an interrogation presents a risk that the guilty suspect may detect
the investigator’s bluff, resulting in a significant loss of credibility and sincerity. For this
reason, we recommend that this tactic be used as a last resort effort.”).
118. Id. at 290 (“[A]n innocent suspect . . . is not apt to confess to a crime merely because
the investigator expresses high confidence in his guilt.”); id. at 429 (“It is our clear position
that merely introducing fictitious evidence during an interrogation would not cause an
innocent person to confess.”). The authors largely base their conclusions on the notion that
it is not “natural” for people to confess to crimes they did not commit. See id. at 428 (“The
important question to answer is whether it is human nature to accept responsibility for
something we did not do in the face of contrary evidence.”); id. at 429 (“Under this
circumstance, the natural human reaction would be one of anger and mistrust toward the
investigator.”).
119. See id. at 284.
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your fingerprints at the scene of the crime?” 120 If the suspect adamantly
denies it, then the interrogator is advised not to bring up the false evidence
again. 121 “However, if the suspect’s behavioral response indicates a lack of
confidence or uncertainty as to whether the evidence might exist, during
the interrogation the investigator can present that same evidence in a more
definitive matter.” 122 The Inabu Manual suggests that interrogators tread
cautiously in this area. This admonition, however, is clearly motivated by
the authors’ concerns about the legal admissibility of a resulting confession
and the risk that false evidence ploys could backfire and fail to produce any
confession at all than from any perceived danger that the techniques might
result in a false confession. 123
Although the Inabu Manual (and its Reid & Associates commercialized
counterpart) is the most widely used, 124 there are several other noteworthy
police interrogation resources. 125 O’Hara & O’Hara’s Fundamentals of
Criminal Investigation (“O’Hara & O’Hara Manual”) 126 is a 900-page
manual that devotes several chapters to interrogation. The authors
recommend a panoply of interrogation techniques, including the use of a
false evidence ploy to produce a confession. Making reference to the
“average person[s’] . . . mystical notions of the power of scientific crime
detection,” the O’Hara & O’Hara Manual suggests that such persons “will
accept practically any claims that science may make.” 127 The O’Hara &
O’Hara Manual further advises that a detective may “mix pseudoscience in
his statements.” 128 It offers specific examples:
In a homicide, the interrogator can refer to hair found at the scene of the

120. Id. at 194 (emphasis omitted). Note that the Inbau Manual recommends the use of a
question during a non-accusatory interview. “During an interrogation, however, the
investigator often must express more confidence that the evidence, in fact, does exist or will
shortly become available.” Id. at 284.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. The authors recommend some specific limitations on the use of the technique. False
evidence ploys should not be used when the suspect claims not to remember what happened,
and when the suspect is youthful or mentally impaired. Id. at 429. See also id. at 160-71
(describing “factors that may lead to misinterpretation of behavior symptoms”); id. at 290
(instructing interrogators not to “attempt to convince a suspect who claims not to recall
whether he committed the crime, that he must have committed it”).
124. Saul M. Kassin, The Psychology of Confession Evidence, 52 AM. PSYCHOL. 221, 222
(1997); White, False Confessions, supra note 101, at 118.
125. All three manuals discussed herein are listed in WRIGHTSMAN & KASSIN, supra note
101, at 65.
126. CHARLES E. O’HARA & GREGORY L. O’HARA, FUNDAMENTALS OF CRIMINAL
INVESTIGATION (7th ed. 2003) [hereinafter O’HARA & O’HARA MANUAL].
127. Id. at 149.
128. Id. at 149-50.
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crime, which can be shown, under the microscope, to be the suspect’s
hair. For added realism, the suspect can be invited to look into the
microscope. In a document case, such as a forgery or a threatening letters
case, a comparison of handwriting can be represented as being
conclusive.” 129

The O’Hara & O’Hara Manual goes on to depict a scenario prescribing
the use of false fingerprint evidence during an interrogation.
Fingerprints are the most effective form of evidence. The layman
believes that they can be left on any object. The investigator should select
some object which was known to have been touched and should face the
suspect with the object. It does bear fingerprints and the fingerprints have
been photographed. The interrogator can show at a discreet distance a
small photograph of a latent fingerprint. The imaginative investigator can
create his own dramatic effects such as having the interrogation
interrupted by the delivery of a message to the effect that the fingerprints
on the weapon have been identified, or that the handwriting has been
positively compared. 130

Although the O’Hara & O’Hara Manual acknowledges that deceptive
interrogation techniques, at their extreme, can lead to false confessions, it
leaves interrogators only with the tautological advice that “Trickery and
deception may be used if it is not of such a nature as to make an innocent
person confess.” 131 In fact, the O’Hara & O’Hara Manual refers
interrogators to the Inabu Manual, which provides a similarly conclusory
“rule of thumb.” 132 The interrogator is to ask himself, “Is what I am about
to do, or say, apt to make an innocent person confess?” 133 If the answer is
no, then the interrogator may proceed with his deceptive tactic.134 Like the
Inabu Manual, the O’Hara & O’Hara Manual juxtaposes a strong
endorsement of police trickery with a skeptical attitude toward the risk of
false confessions. 135
Another interrogation manual is Macdonald & Michaud’s The
Confession (“Macdonald & Michaud Manual”). 136 In contrast to the Inabu
129. Id. at 150.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 177; see also id. at 147.
132. Id. at 147 (citing Fred E. Inbau, Legally Permissible Criminal Interrogation Tactics
and Techniques, 4 J. POLICE SCI. & ADMIN. 249 (1976)).
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Like the Inbau Manual, the O’Hara & O’Hara Manual also relies on the belief that
interrogators can more or less determine whether a suspect is truthful or lying by examining
his body language and physiological symptoms. Id. at 152-53.
136. JOHN M. MACDONALD & DAVID L. MICHAUD, THE CONFESSION: INTERROGATION AND
CRIMINAL PROFILES FOR POLICE OFFICERS (1987) [hereinafter MACDONALD & MICHAUD
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ManuaL and the O’Hara & O’Hara Manual, the Macdonald & Michaud
Manual strongly advises against outright trickery—not out of a concern
that such tactics may induce false confessions, but out of a concern that the
technique may backfire if the suspect learns of the deception. 137 The
Macdonald & Michaud Manual, however, stops short of discouraging
detectives from implying that substantial false evidence exists: “A large
case folder on the desk suggests that the investigation has revealed much
information, yet the folder may contain records on another case.”138 Aside
from its general disapproval of explicit deception, the Macdonald &
Michaud Manual corresponds with the Inabu Manual and the O’Hara &
O’Hara Manual on two important points: first, the Macdonald & Michaud
Manual shares a skepticism about false confessions; 139 and second, all
three manuals rely on a confidence that police officers can detect, during an
interview, whether the suspect is guilty or innocent.140
Another interrogation manual is The Gentle Art of Interviewing and
Interrogation by Royal & Schutt (“Royal & Schutt Manual”). 141 This
volume is far less comprehensive than the other manuals discussed. 142 Its
approach to the use of deceptive interrogation tactics is ambivalent. The

MANUAL].
137. Id. at 23.
Do not make any false statements. Do not tell him his fingerprints were found at
the scene if they were not found at the scene. Do not tell him he was identified by
an eyewitness if he was not identified by an eyewitness. If he catches you in a
false statement, he will not longer trust you, he will assume that you do not have
sufficient evidence to prove his guilt, and his self-confidence will go up.
Id.; see also id. at 46 (“Reminders: No threats, no promises, no false statements.”).
138. Id. at 19.
139. Id. at 7 (explaining that false confessions are brought about by a “wish for publicity
and notoriety,” warning that some people “who make false confessions . . . later commit
murder,” and stating that “[o]ther reasons for false confessions are to obtain a bed for the
night in freezing weather, or to obtain transport to a distant city where the crime occurred”).
140. Id. at 36-38, 40-43 (listing “clues to deception”). Tellingly, many of the authors’
“clues to decpetion” are inconsistent or self-contradictory.
“Brief answers” and
“excessively detailed answers” both indicate that a suspect is lying. Id. at 36. In addition,
“politeness,” “irritability,” and “short-lived anger” are all sure signs of deception. Id. at 38.
The suspect who avoids eye contact, as well as the suspect who engages in “prolonged eye
contact,” is lying. Id. at 41. At times the authors’ claims are simply bizarre. For example,
if you can see white under the suspect’s iris, then “the detective has touched on an area that
is troubling to the subject.” Id.
141. ROBERT F. ROYAL & STEVEN R. SCHUTT, THE GENTLE ART OF INTERVIEWING AND
INTERROGATION: A PROFESSIONAL MANUAL AND GUIDE (1976) [hereinafter ROYAL &
SCHUTT MANUAL].
142. For instance, there is a section devoted to “Interviewing Women,” in which the
reader is warned that “[a]ny attempt on the part of the interviewer to inhibit the flow of
subjective content, especially if strong emotions or feelings are involved, will usually result
in an almost immediate breakdown of rapport.” Id. at 111.
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Royal & Schutt Manual never discusses the use of false evidence ploys
expressly, though they suggest that bluffing may be permissible: “In some
cases, the use of deception, such as staged events or bluffs, may be
acceptable. There can be no justification, however, for deliberate lies or
false promises.” 143 The Royal & Schutt Manual is murky as to where to
draw the line between “the use of deception . . . or bluffs” and “deliberate
lies.” The Royal & Schutt Manual warns interrogators, “Never bluff if
there is the least chance that the suspect will detect the bluff.” 144 Without
expressly advocating that interrogators use a false evidence ploy, the Royal
& Schutt Manual notes that “[a] suspect is usually more convinced by
specific illustrations and physical evidence than he is by alleged statements
of his guilt or by circumstantial evidence.” 145 Thus, the authors provide the
reader with the information he needs to use a false evidence ploy against a
suspect, without expressly advocating the use of this tactic. Later in the
book, the authors write: “Bluffs or staged situations are sometimes used,
but dependence on them should be avoided.” 146 The Royal & Schutt
Manual does not, however, elaborate on the reasons for this advice, nor
does it ever address the risk that bluffing about the existence of evidence
may lead to false confessions.
B. Critiques of Leading Interrogation Techniques Which Explain Why
Suspects May Confess Falsely When Confronted With False Evidence
and Other Deception
A number of critiques of the leading interrogation techniques prescribed
by Reid, Inbau and others have described the reasons that the use of
deception and trickery during interrogations leads to false confessions.
Most of these critiques describe the kinds of cost/benefit analyses suspects
undertake before deciding to incriminate themselves, regardless of guilt or
innocence. The critiques and related theories help illustrate the impact
trickery and deception, particularly an exaggeration or misrepresentation of
the existence or quantum of independent incriminating evidence, have on
even innocent suspects.
i. Rational Choice: A Theory of False Confession
Critics of the Reid Technique employ what they call a “rational choice”

143.
144.
145.
146.

Id. at 68.
Id. at 121.
Id.
Id. at 146.
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model to explain how false confessions can occur. 147 The model is
consistent with Reid & Inbau’s theory that a rational person will do what he
perceives to be in his best interest. 148 Although most suspects enter an
interrogation room believing that it is against their best interest to confess,
the object of the Reid Technique is to convince suspects that confession is
in their best interest. 149 Underlying the rational choice model is a
definition of “best interest” that weighs the costs against the benefits of a
potential course of action.150 To this end, the Reid Technique requires
interrogators to convince suspects that the benefits of confession will be
relatively high (e.g. lenient sentencing, end of stressful interrogation,
release from custody) and that the costs of his confession will be relatively
low (e.g. he will be convicted anyway because there is enough other
evidence to prove the case against him). 151
From the law enforcement perspective, if the police were initially correct
in their determination that the suspect is guilty, then their manipulation of
what the suspect perceives as his best interest will produce a just outcome.
Under the rational choice model, however, the suspect’s actual guilt or
innocence has little bearing on whether he confesses; rather, he will confess
whenever the costs of confession as he perceives them are outweighed by
the benefits of confession, regardless of his culpability. 152
It is with respect to the perceived costs of confession that false evidence
ploys are particularly salient. When a suspect is confronted with seemingly
incontrovertible evidence of his guilt, he is likely to conclude that he is
certain to be convicted even though he is innocent. 153 The suspect may
believe that he has been framed somehow, that there was a mistake in the

147. See generally Richard J. Ofshe & Richard A. Leo, The Decision to Confess Falsely:
Rational Choice and Irrational Action, 74 DENV. U. L. REV. 979 (1997) [hereinafter Ofshe
& Leo, The Decision to Confess Falsely] (theorizing that an innocent person could confess
when convinced that confession is the most rational course of action, given his
circumstances and options as he perceives them); see also GUDJONSSON, supra note 100, at
64-65; Drizin & Leo, supra note 3, at 913.
148. See Jayne & Buckley, supra note 101, at 11 (“A psychologically healthy suspect
will not engage in behavior that will jeopardize [his] self-interests.”).
149. Drizin & Leo, supra note 3, at 913 (“According to this model, the interrogator’s goal
is to persuade the suspect that the act of admission is in his self-interest.”); see also supra
notes 93-100 and accompanying text.
150. See Ofshe & Leo, The Decision to Confess Falsely, supra note 147150, at 985
(stating that the interrogator’s objective is to convince the suspect that the “marginal
benefits of confessing outweigh the marginal costs”).
151. See id. at 990.
152. See Kassin, Does Innocence Put Innocents at Risk?, supra note 29, at 221; White,
False Confessions, supra note 101, at 119, 133.
153. See Kassin, Does Innocence Put Innocents at Risk?, supra note 29, at 146; see also
White, Miranda’s Failure, supra note 23, at 1242-43.
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analysis of the evidence, or that he is just very unlucky in that all the
evidence points to him, an innocent person.154 Regardless of what the
suspect believes the source of the error to be, he is likely to believe that any
reasonable jury, viewing the evidence, will be convinced of his guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt. 155 When faced with overwhelming evidence
against him, the innocent suspect may rationally conclude that the costs of
his confession are relatively low because he is likely to be convicted
regardless of whether he confesses. 156 Weighing against these lowered
costs of confession are its relatively high benefits; the suspect may be
spared a harsh penalty in the long term, 157 and in the short term the stress
of an interrogation may be ameliorated or truncated.158 In other words, a
suspect’s cost-benefit calculation changes when independent incriminating
evidence is added to the equation. Whereas confessing to a crime for
which the police have little independent evidence (regardless of whether
one committed the offense) would ordinarily carry extraordinary costs and
no benefits, the presence (or apparition) of overwhelming evidence flips the
cost-benefit calculation such that one has some reason to confess and may
154. See Ofshe & Leo, The Decision to Confess Falsely, supra note 147, at 1009 (“For an
innocent suspect who naively trusts the police and believes that they would not lie, the
cumulative effect of an endless stream of false evidence can be devastating.”).
155. See id. at 1013 (“The fact that the suspect’s denials of the evidence has failed to
convince the investigator of the his [sic] innocence is intended to serve as a demonstration.
The implication is that he will also be unable to convince a prosecutor, a judge, or a jury of
his innocence. The investigator strives to create the impression that because his opinion is
based on hard facts, all other equally reasonable and informed persons will reach the same
conclusion.”); see also Kassin, Does Innocence Put Innocents at Risk?, supra note 29, at
222 (showing that in fact mock jury studies have demonstrated that confessions are more
potent than eyewitness evidence and other forms of human evidence and that juries do not
fully discount confessions even when they are supposed to legally).
156. See Ofshe & Leo, The Decision to Confess Falsely, supra note 147, at 985-86
(“Police elicit the decision to confess from the guilty by leading them to believe that the
evidence against them is overwhelming, that their fate is certain (whether or not they
confess), and that there are advantages that follow if they confess.”).
157. See Drizin & Leo, supra note 3, at 916-17.
158. See White, False Confessions, supra note 101, at 146. The prospect of being
released from custody after hours of interrogation is enough to induce some suspects to
confess. See Welsh S. White, Confessions Induced By Broken Government Promises, 43
DUKE L.J. 947, 982-83 (1994) (discussing the case of Leo Bruce, who confessed to killing
several people at a Thai Buddhist temple near Phoenix after an FBI agent falsely told Bruce
that police had evidence establishing that he was at the temple the night of the murders;
even after he repeatedly denied involvement in the murders, he was interrogated for several
more hours until he finally confessed; Bruce was never brought to trial, because evidence
discovered after he confessed established that his confession was false); see also White,
Confessions in Capital Cases, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 979, 1020-21 (reporting that Bruce
confessed after he was questioned for thirteen hours; when asked why he would confess to
capital crimes, he replied, “I just wanted it to end right there. I wanted to sleep. I was
exhausted.”).
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believe that he has little reason to remain silent.
According to the rational choice model, then, two components of the
Reid Technique converge to create an arguably significant risk of false
confession. First is the authors’ unjustified confidence in the interrogator’s
ability to discern the guilt or innocence of the suspect based on the
suspect’s behavior, body language, and other armchair psychology.159
Second is the interrogator’s liberal use of trickery, deceit, and fictitious
evidence to convince the presumed guilty suspect that he is certain to be
convicted. 160 If the interrogator truly were able to know with any certainty
whether the suspect was guilty or innocent, then the false evidence ploys
might be justified as a means of rendering criminal interrogations and
investigations more efficient. At the same time, if the interrogator did not
use false evidence to manipulate the suspect’s perceived self-interest, then
the interrogator’s occasional error in prejudging the guilt of the suspect
would be unlikely to result in false confessions. The combination,
however, of these two errors—an observational error that occurs when the
officers erroneously presume guilt and an ethical error when officers
deliberately mislead suspects—can lead a suspect to confess even when he
knows he is actually innocent. 161
159. See GUDJONSSON, supra note 100, at 48; Kassin, The Psychology of Confession
Evidence, supra note 124, at 222
Research has consistently shown that people are poor intuitive judges of truth and
deception. In fact, even so-called experts who make such judgments for a
living—police interrogators; judges; psychiatrists; and polygraphers for the
Central Intelligence Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigations, and the
military—are highly prone to error.
(internal citations omitted); see also Saul M. Kassin et al., Behavioral Confirmation in the
Interrogation Room: On the Dangers of Presuming Guilt, 27 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 187,
188-89 (2003); Kassin, Does Innocence Put Innocents at Risk?, supra note 29, at 219-20
It is possible that police who commit themselves to [measuring their success by
their ability to extract a confession] are, at times, not merely blinded by their
initial beliefs [that the suspect is guilty] but motivated to reinforce them . . . [A]
warehouse of psychology research suggests that once people form an impression,
they unwittingly seek, interpret, and create behavioral data that verify it.
Saul M. Kassin & Christina T. Fong, “I’m Innocent!”: Effects of Training on Judgments of
Truth and Deception in the Interrogation Room, 34 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 499, 500-01
(1999); Saul M. Kassin & Gisli H. Gudjonsson, The Psychology of Confessions: A Review
of Literature and Issues, 5 PSYCHOL. SCI. PUB. INT. 35, 40 (2004) [hereinafter Kassin &
Gudjonson, The Psychology of Confessions] (discussing psychological tests which showed
that people who have undergone training in judging the accuracy of confessions are actually
“significantly less accurate than those who did not [undergo the training] . . . though they
were more confident in their judgments [of guilt or innocence]”); Christian A. Meissner &
Saul M. Kassin, “He’s Guilty!”: Investigator Bias in Judgments of Truth and Deception, 26
L. & HUM. BEHAV. 469, 470 (2002).
160. GUDJONSSON, supra note 100, at 48.
161. Kassin, Does Innocence Put Innocents at Risk?, supra note 124, at 220. In fact,
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ii. Observational Study of Police Interrogation Methods
The question of how often police use trickery in interrogation is hard to
answer. In 1996, Professor Richard Leo published a quantitative study,
Inside the Interrogation Room, which—based on his personal observation
of police interrogations in a major urban police department—examined the
details of police interrogation techniques.162 This is not a study of false
confessions, so Leo did not explore the likelihood that any one of these
techniques would cause the suspect to confess to a crime that he did not
commit. Rather, the study yielded data on which interrogation techniques
were prevalent, whether they were successful at eliciting confessions, and
what kind of suspects were most susceptible to each kind of interrogation
technique. 163
Leo observed that it was routine for detectives to begin an interrogation
by confronting the suspect with evidence of his guilt and then suggesting
that it was in his best interest to confess. 164 In fact, this technique was
utilized in approximately ninety percent of the interrogations Leo
observed. 165 In eighty-five percent of the interrogations Leo observed, the
police confronted the suspect with actual (not fictitious) evidence of his
guilt. 166 In thirty percent of the interrogations, the police used false
evidence to try to convince the suspect to confess. 167 Leo’s study
concluded that the use of evidence against the suspect was a highly
effective method of eliciting self-incriminating information.168 Moreover,
it turned out that the presentation of false evidence was slightly more
effective than the use of actual evidence.169 Detectives were successful in
eliciting self-incriminating information from suspects in seventy-eight
percent of the cases where suspects were told of actual evidence, and in
eighty-three percent of the cases where the police lied to suspects about the

psychological studies show that innocence may actually render a suspect more likely to
submit to interrogation, waive his rights, and confess to a crime that he erroneously believes
the objective evidence will disprove, even in the face of false evidence ploys. Id. at 224.
162. See generally Richard A. Leo, Inside the Interrogation Room, 86 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 266 (1996).
163. Id. at 268 (“This Article takes the reader inside the interrogation room to understand
the characteristics, context, and outcome of contemporary police interrogation practices in
America. It is the only study to do so in more than twenty-five years, and the first ever to do
so in any sustained, explicit, or comprehensive manner.”).
164. Id. at 279.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 277 tbl.5.
167. Id.
168. See id. at 293.
169. See id.
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existence of incriminating evidence.170
Leo’s study also demonstrated that suspects from lower socio-economic
backgrounds or with prior felony convictions were more vulnerable to
these techniques than others. 171
In addition to Leo’s empirical report on prevalent interrogation
techniques, several significant psychological studies on confessions have
produced results which help explain the false evidence ploys’ coercive
effect. 172
iii. Psychological Analysis of Interrogation Techniques: Maximization and
Minimization
Psychology professor Saul Kassin described the Reid Technique as
essentially boiling down to two interrogation methods used frequently, and
sometimes in combination, by the police.173 The first is minimization: the
interrogator takes a sympathetic approach, telling the suspect that what he
did was understandable, justifiable, and will not produce significant
adverse consequences. 174 This generally works well with emotional or
“remorseful” suspects who are easily lulled into a false sense of security by
the awareness that someone else empathizes with their plight.175
The second interrogation method Professor Kassin identifies is
maximization: the interrogator aggressively confronts the suspect with the
magnitude of his situation, hoping to convince him that he is in serious
trouble and likely to be punished severely. 176 This generally works with
“non-emotional” suspects who are able to logically evaluate the costs and
benefits of their situation and comprehend that their best option is
confession. 177 The evidence bluff is an overt form of maximization: 178
The interrogator would thus pretend to have strong circumstantial
evidence (e.g., the suspect’s fingerprints at the scene of the crime), have a

170. Id.
171. See id. at 295. The use of false evidence in the interrogation room was particularly
effective with suspects from lower economic class backgrounds: eighty-eight percent of
those suspects provided self-incriminating information. Id. Suspects with prior felony
records were even more vulnerable: ninety-six percent of those suspects provided selfincriminating information when confronted with false evidence against them. Id.
172. See infra notes 173-193 and accompanying text.
173. Kassin, The Psychology of Confession Evidence, supra note 124, at 223-24.
174. Id. at 223.
175. See GUDJONSSON, supra note 100, at 38.
176. Kassin, The Psychology of Confession Evidence, supra note 124, at 223.
177. See GUDJONSSON, supra note 100, at 38; see also INBAU MANUAL, supra note 92, at
210, 290 (discussing interrogation techniques for emotional and non-emotional offenders).
178. See Kassin, The Psychology of Confession Evidence, supra note 124, at 223.
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policeman pose as an eyewitness and identify the suspect in a rigged lineup, or even—through elaborate staging devices—try to persuade the
suspect that he or she has already been implicated by an accomplice or cosuspect. 179

According to Kassin, interrogators recognize that non-emotional
suspects are likely to respond “logically” to their perceived circumstances.
The non-emotional suspect, confronted with overwhelming evidence
against him, is expected to make the only rational decision available to
him: confessing to the crime. 180
As discussed above, suspects confronted with what appears to be
overwhelming evidence against them may confess falsely merely because
they perceive the benefits of confessing outweigh its costs.181 Confessions
are more likely to occur when the fictitious evidence is presented as strong,
perhaps overwhelming. 182 Suspects tend to believe that “scientific”
evidence—such as DNA, fingerprints, and even lie detector tests 183—are
generally accepted by juries as infallible proof of guilt:
Evidence ploys that are based on well known technical or modern
scientific procedures are likely to be more influential because the mere
mention of a special technology—whether it is well-known or new—
carries the prestige and incomprehensibility of modern science. Both the
guilty and the innocent have a harder time explaining away evidence that
is allegedly derived from scientific technologies. 184

Suspects generally view witness evidence—such as eyewitness
statements, line-up or photo array identifications, and statements from codefendants and jailhouse snitches 185—to be significantly less
threatening. 186 Additionally, suspects are more intimidated when the
interrogator provides specific details of the damaging evidence rather than
general assertions that strong evidence exists. 187 Psychologically, the
evidence has a greater impact on the suspect when it is presented visually,
either in a plastic bag, a thick manila case folder, or as a printed report from

179. WRIGHTSMAN & KASSIN, supra note 101, at 77.
180. For a comprehensive description of the various types of false confessions, see id., at
225-26; see also GUDJONSSON, supra note 100, at 226-28.
181. See supra notes 147-158 and accompanying text.
182. See Kassin, The Psychology of Confession Evidence, supra note 124, at 225; Ofshe
& Leo, The Decision to Confess Falsely, supra note 147, at 1013.
183. See Ofshe & Leo, The Decision to Confess Falsely, supra note 147, at 1023-38.
184. Id. at 1023.
185. See id. at 1015-22.
186. White, Miranda’s Failure, supra note 23, at 1243.
187. Id.
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the laboratory. 188
Because interrogators are well aware that “maximization” is most
effective when presented visually, with specificity, and in “scientific” form,
they are likely to shape their false evidence ploys to fit these criteria.
When police use real evidence as an interrogation tactic, of course, they are
limited to whatever form of evidence they actually possess—statements
from an eyewitness, for example. But when the police are permitted to
invent the evidence for the purposes of bluffing the suspect into a
confession, they are at liberty to create an illusion of the existence of
evidence most likely to impress the suspect. 189 Sometimes this means
employing more “science fiction” than actual science. For example, Ofshe
and Leo have reported interrogators’ presentation of imaginary technology
such as a test purporting to lift fingerprints from a corpse, or a method
purported to prove scientifically whether a particular suspect fired the
murder weapon. 190
Finally, most scholars agree that false evidence ploys are more likely to
be successful when the suspect being interrogated is especially vulnerable
to manipulation. Kassin suggests that vulnerability factors include “youth,
interpersonal trust, naiveté, suggestibility, lack of intelligence, stress,
fatigue, alcohol, or drug use.” 191 Gudjonsson has conducted extensive
studies on suggestibility, the details of which are beyond the scope of this
article.192 Even the Inabu Manual acknowledges that certain classes of

188. See id.
189. See Ofshe & Leo, The Decision to Confess Falsely supra note 147, at 1015-50.
Ofshe & Leo provide testimonials from suspects and excerpts from dozens of interrogation
transcripts, impressively demonstrating that law enforcement officials really do use the
interview techniques described in the literature. Id. For a quantitative analysis based on
observation of police interrogations, see generally Leo, Inside the Interrogation Room,
supra note 162. For items in the popular media confirming police use of deceptive tactics in
their attempts to elicit confessions, see Disclosure: Inside the Interrogation Room (CBC
News
television
broadcast
Jan.
28,
2003),
available
at
http://www.cbc.ca/disclosure/archives/030128_confess/murder.html
(reporting
false
confessions in a murder case and criticizing the Reid Technique); Fresh Air (National
Public Radio broadcast Feb. 25, 2005) (interview with former NYPD Detective Bill Clark)
(originally
broadcast
Nov.
1,
1995),
available
at
http://www.npr.org/templates/rundowns/rundown.php?prgId=13&prgDate=02-25-2005
(stating that detectives regularly lie to suspects about the evidence against them in order to
elicit a confession).
190. See Ofshe & Leo, The Decision to Confess Falsely, supra note 147, at 1026
(reporting San Diego detectives’ “use” of a non-existent technology, the “Cobalt Blue” test,
that can lift fingerprints from a corpse); id. at 1033 (reporting investigators’ invention of the
“Neutron Proton Negligence Intelligence Test” to convince a suspect that there was
scientific proof he had fired the murder weapon).
191. Id. at 227.
192. See GUDJONSSON, supra note 100, at 131-64.
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suspects, such as juveniles and the mentally impaired, are not always suited
for complex interrogation techniques. 193
C. Inbau’s Defense
The Inabu Manual devotes an entire chapter—completely new in the
Fourth Edition—to responding to the “critics of police interrogation.” 194 In
this chapter, the Inabu Manual responds to claims that standard
interrogation practices produce false confessions. The authors emphasize
that the Reid Technique does not instruct interrogators to make any threats
or promises involving “real consequences”:
As a general guideline, areas that are considered impermissible as topics
of threats or promises during an interrogation address real consequences.
Real consequences affect the suspect’s physical or emotional health,
personal freedom (arrest, jail, or prison), or financial status (losing a job
or paying large fines). It should be emphasized that merely discussing
real consequences during an interrogation does not constitute coercion. It
is only when the investigator uses real consequences as leverage to induce
a confession through the use of threats or promises that coercion may be
claimed.
Our long-standing position has been that interrogation
incentives that are apt to cause an innocent person to confess are
improper. 195

Instead of making explicit threats and promises, the Inabu Manual
recommends that interrogators merely make ambiguous statements that
could be interpreted by a suspect as a threat or promise. For instance, the
Inabu Manual insists that there is a difference between a detective who
explicitly promises the suspect that he will talk to the judge and make sure
he is put on probation and a detective who merely suggests that he will
include in his report information from a confession that could reflect
favorably on the suspect. 196 Moreover, the Inabu Manual insists that the
“self-preservation instincts” of an innocent suspect will withstand the
standard interrogation techniques prescribed in the manual. 197 It also
maintains that false confessions result only from interrogations in which
“improper inducements, such as threats and promises, or deprivation of
193. INBAU MANUAL, supra note 92, at 429; see also Singletary v. Fischer, 365 F. Supp.
2d 328, 337 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (citing Inbau’s Fourth Edition as warning against the use of
techniques “designed to persuade” suspects “who are unintelligent, uneducated, and come
from a low cultural background”).
194. INBAU MANUAL, supra note 92, at 411-47; see also id. at 412 (“Even critics of police
interrogation agree that most confessions are true.”).
195. Id. at 418.
196. Id. at 420.
197. Id. at 447.
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biological needs were used.” 198
Critics such as Kassin doubt that suspects distinguish clearly between
explicit threats and promises and more ambiguous language with
underlying threats and promises. 199 The Inabu Manual nevertheless
insists—without the benefit of empirical corroborating evidence—that even
if the guilty suspect does not make such a distinction, the difference is
enough to prevent the innocent from falsely confessing:
An innocent suspect who is told that it is important to explain the reason
behind committing the crime will predictably reject the investigator’s
entire premise and explain that he had no involvement in the crime
whatsoever. A guilty suspect who hears exactly this same message may
start to entertain possible benefits as to why it might be important to tell
the truth. 200

In other words, according to the leading interrogation manual, an
implied threat or promise will have the same effect as an explicit threat or
promise when police are dealing with guilty suspects. Innocent suspects,
however, will not respond to implied threats or promises.
The argument posited by the Inabu Manual fails entirely to address the
risks attending the false evidence ploy. The false evidence ploy is a type of
implied threat: if the suspect does not confess, then he will be convicted
with independent incriminating evidence without the opportunity to enter
any mitigating statement into the record. False evidence, when seemingly
irrefutable, is therefore unlikely to have a greater influence on guilty
persons than on innocent persons. An innocent person and a guilty person
alike are likely to see the “evidence” for what it appears to be—a threat of
dire consequences awaiting them regardless of whether they confess. In
fact, by any rational calculation, a confession may ameliorate the otherwise
inevitable and unhappy consequences awaiting the suspect, whether he is
guilty or innocent.
The Inabu Manual attempts to take up this challenge again later in the
chapter. 201 The authors insist that the use of false evidence alone would
never cause an innocent person to confess.202 Instead, they insist that false
198. Id.
199. See Kassin, The Psychology of Confession Evidence, supra note 124, at 223-24; Saul
M. Kassin & Karlyn McNall, Police Interrogations and Confessions: Communicating
Promises and Threats by Pragmatic Implication, 15 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 233, 235 (1991)
[hereinafter Kassin & McNall, Police Interrogations and Confessions]; see also INBAU
MANUAL, supra note 92, at 420.
200. INBAU MANUAL, supra note 92, at 421-22.
201. See id. at 427-29.
202. Id. at 428. “Would a suspect, innocent of a homicide, bury his head in his hands and
confess because he was told that the murder weapon was found during a search of his home?
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evidence would only cause a false confession when coupled with the
interrogator’s use of a “threat of inevitable consequences” or a promise of
leniency. 203 The Reid Technique’s admonishment against threats is
considered sufficient protection against false confessions even if the
interrogation involves false evidence ploys and other forms of trickery. 204
The Inabu Manual defense is founded on the notion that a suspect will
make a carefully considered rational analysis of the options he is presented
with and will only confess if he knows he is guilty and knows he stands to
lose more if he continues to deceive police. This premise fails to take into
account facts that the empirical laboratory studies discussed in the ensuing
section and that real-life false confession cases have borne out 205: that
some suspects—juveniles, the mentally impaired206—are incapable of
making such finely calibrated decisions; that a skilled interrogator’s
persistence and intimidation of a suspect may overbear the will even of
mature, mentally intact suspects; and that some suspects simply decide that
even if they confess falsely the objective evidence will later corroborate
their claims of innocence.207
Some of the seminal empirical studies on false confessions help to
establish these points.
D. Empirical Studies Establishing That Confronting Suspects With
False Evidence And Other Deceptive Interrogation Practices Induces
Suspects to Confess Falsely
Scholars have performed a number of empirical studies of false
confessions. The studies discussed in this article fall into two general
categories. First, psychology experiments conducted in a laboratory;
second non-observational statistical analyses of confessions later shown to
be false.

Of course not!” Id.
203. Id. at 429.
204. Id.
205. See Saul M. Kassin & Katherine L. Kiechel, The Social Psychology of False
Confessions: Compliance, Internalization, and Confabulation, 7 PSYCHOL. SCI. 125, 126
(1996); see also Leo & Ofshe, The Consequences of False Confessions, supra note 14, at
490-92 (detailing the case of Juan Rivera, a mentally handicapped twenty-year old, who
signed two police-written confessions admitting he raped and murdered a young girl, and
whose conviction was later overturned).
206. See Singletary v. Fischer, 365 F. Supp. 2d 328, 337 (E.D.N.Y. 2005).
207. See Kassin & Gudjonsson, The Psychology of Confessions, supra note 159, at 56.
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i. Laboratory Experiment
Saul Kassin established an experiment to test the hypothesis that
“presentation of false evidence can lead individuals . . . to confess to an act
they did not commit.” 208 Each subject in the experiment was asked to take
a typing test on a computer, with half the tests conducted at a fast pace and
half at a slow pace. 209 All subjects were specifically warned not to hit the
“ALT” key because this would cause the computer to crash and data to be
lost. 210 Although none of the subjects actually hit the “ALT” key, a
computer crash was simulated and the subjects were accused of doing
so. 211 Initially, each subject confidently denied the accusation.212 But
then, in half the scenarios, another subject in the room (actually a plant,
working with Professor Kassin) claimed to have witnessed the subject hit
the “ALT” key as he had been expressly instructed not to do. 213 The
experiment then measured the subjects’ response to this presentation of
“false evidence.”
The experiment sought to measure three different kinds of responses:
Compliance was
compliance, internalization, and confabulation.214
detected if the subject agreed to sign a statement admitting to having hit the
“ALT” key, thereby crashing the program and destroying data.215
Internalization was detected if the subject, when asked later by another
plant what had happened, reported that she had hit the wrong key and
caused the computer to crash (rather than, for instance, “They said I hit the
wrong key”). 216 Confabulation was detected if the subject was actually
able to recall and describe how and when she hit the wrong key, despite
having never done so. 217
The experiment produced the following remarkable results: 218

FORM
INFLUENCE

208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.

NO WITNESS
OF Slow Pace Fast Pace

Kassin & Kiechel, supra note 205, at 126.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 126-27.
See id. at 127 tbl.1.

WITNESS
Slow Pace

Fast Pace
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89%
44%
6%
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100%
65%
35%

As the results demonstrate, the subjects were much more likely to
confess when confronted with false evidence against them, though they
were less likely to do so when the pace of the typing test was slow,
presumably leaving them with more certainty as to which keys they
actually hit. 219
ii. False Confession Studies: Empirical Data on the Role of Police Trickery
In Actual Wrongful Convictions.
The landmark empirical study of “miscarriages of justice,” in which the
innocent were convicted, is arguably Bedau & Radelet’s 1987 study
published in the Stanford Law Review (“Bedau & Radelet Study”). 220
Although a full analysis of the Bedau & Radelet Study is beyond the scope
of this article, their study provided much-needed statistical support for the
claim that wrongful conviction of the innocent is a real and ongoing
phenomenon. 221 Identifying 350 potentially capital cases of the twentieth
century in which a miscarriage of justice had occurred, Bedau & Radelet
concluded that the wrongful conviction was caused by a police-induced
false confession in fourteen percent of the cases.222 The Bedau-Radelet
Study, though groundbreaking, does not provide a breakdown of the false
confessions showing what kind of interrogation techniques were employed
to induce the suspect to confess. Therefore, although it is certainly
significant in demonstrating the frequency of false confessions, it is of
limited use in an analysis focused on police use of false evidence ploys.
Since Bedau & Radelet, two studies have examined the phenomenon of

219. Id.
220. See generally Hugo Adam Bedau & Michael L. Radelet, Miscarriages of Justice in
Potentially Capital Cases, 40 STAN. L. REV. 21 (1987); see also Drizin & Leo, supra note 3,
at 902 (describing Bedau & Radelet’s article as a “watershed study”); Leo & Ofshe, The
Consequences of False Confessions, supra note 14, at 432 n.9 (“The leading contemporary
research in this tradition is Bedau and Radelet’s landmark study of miscarriages of
justice.”).
221. White, Miranda’s Failure, supra note 23, at 1227; see also Samuel R. Gross et al.,
Exonerations in the United States 1989 Through 2003, supra note 22, at 527 (“The rate of
exonerations increased sharply over the fifteen year period of this study, from an average of
twelve a year from 1989 through 1994, to an average of forty-two a year since 2000.”).
222. Bedau & Radelet, supra note 220, at 57-58. Perjury by prosecution witnesses and
mistaken eye-witness identification were more likely to cause the miscarriage of justice, but
false confessions ranked third. Id. at 56.
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false confessions more closely. In 1998, Leo & Ofshe published a study
examining sixty cases of police-induced false confessions, 223 and in 2004,
Drizin & Leo expanded on Leo & Ofshe’s study by examining 125
cases. 224 Both studies provided detailed analyses of what happened to the
suspects after they falsely confessed. 225 The Drizin & Leo study further
reported the age of suspects who falsely confessed 226 as well as
information, when available, about how long the suspects’ interrogation
lasted before they falsely confessed.227 Although the data usefully
examines the danger that false confession will lead to conviction as well as
the special vulnerability of youthful suspects and suspects whose
interrogations have lasted many hours, it provides little quantitative insight
into the psychological techniques, such as false evidence ploys, utilized by
police interrogators.
In fact, in the Inabu Manual, the response to the empirical work on false
confessions and interrogation techniques 228 begins by addressing the
“anecdotal accounts of presumably false confessions.” 229 The Inabu
Manual cites the Ofshe & Leo study 230 and criticizes its failure to prove
statistical significance or causation:
Anecdotal reports of false confessions have emotional appeal to the
uninformed audience. However, they offer no insight as to the actual
frequency or cause of false confessions. As such, they offer no scientific
basis for drawing any conclusions as to false confessions, other than that
some suspects historically have falsely confessed. 231

The authors of the Inabu Manual then respond to Kassin’s laboratory
experiments, which they deride as being too far removed from real life to
have any significance: “The fundamental problem with laboratory studies is
the inability to generalize those findings to the field situation.” 232 Finally,
the Inabu Manual dismisses the importance of Leo’s Inside the
Interrogation Room233 by noting that even though the police in that study

223. Leo & Ofshe, The Consequences of False Confessions, supra note 14.
224. Drizin & Leo, supra note 3.
225. See id. at 949-63; Leo & Ofshe, The Consequences of False Confessions, supra note
14, at 472-91.
226. See Drizin & Leo, supra note 3, at 944-45.
227. See id., at 948-49.
228. INBAU MANUAL, supra note 92, at 441-46.
229. Id. at 442 (citing Kassin & McNall, Police Interrogations and Confessions, supra
note 199).
230. Leo & Ofshe, The Consequences of False Confessions, supra note 14.
231. INBAU MANUAL, supra note 92, at 443.
232. Id. at 445.
233. Leo, Inside the Interrogation Room, supra note 162.
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employed some coercive techniques, Leo reported no instances of false
confession. 234
Although Drizin & Leo’s 2004 study, which is the most comprehensive
analysis to date of the impact of false confessions on convictions later
proven wrongful by DNA testing, does not assess the role of trickery and
other deceptive law enforcement tactics in producing false confessions,
other reviews of actual false confession cases have shown that trickery is a
coercive factor leading the suspect to falsely incriminate himself. For
example, Ofshe & Leo have examined the likelihood that various types of
deceptive interrogation techniques will induce a suspect to falsely
confess. 235 They have concluded that the psychological interrogation
tactics advocated in police training manuals straightforwardly cause
suspects to confess to crimes they did not commit. 236 In addition, Professor
Welsh White studied the role of false confessions in capital cases and
concluded that misrepresenting the presence or strength of forensic
evidence sometimes produces false confessions.237 Accordingly, he
recommended that legislatures and courts proscribe police from
misrepresenting the nature of forensic evidence against capital suspects.238
The empirical studies described in the preceding paragraphs illuminate
the phenomena that took place in the Central Park Jogger case: the coercive
effect of deceptive interrogation techniques and the unreliability of the
confessions they induce. Moreover, these studies show that Martin
Tankleff and the young men exonerated of the Central Park Jogger attack
are assuredly only two case examples of many in which police
misrepresentation has induced an innocent person to confess. 239

234. INBAU MANUAL, supra note 92, at 446.
235. See Richard J. Ofshe & Richard A. Leo, The Social Psychology of Police
Interrogation: The Theory and Classification of True and False Confessions, 16 STUD. IN L.
POL. & SOC’Y 189, 202 (1997); see also Leo & Ofshe, Consequences of False Confessions,
supra note 14, at 440 (citing psychological interrogation methods and poor interrogation
training as causes of false confessions).
236. Id. at 492.
237. See White, Confessions in Capital Cases, supra note 158, at 1018.
238. Id. at 1018-19.
239. See id. at 1016-18 (describing the case of David Vasquez who was wrongfully
convicted of murder in Virginia after police falsely told him that his fingerprints had been
found at the crime scene); Kassin, Does Innocence Put Innocents at Risk?, supra note 29, at
221 (describing the case of Michael Crow, who at the age of fourteen falsely confessed to
murdering his sister after police told him the following untrue “facts”: that his hair was
found in her fist, that her blood had been found in his bedroom, that the crime was an inside
job because all doors to the house were found locked, and that Crow had failed a lie detector
test); Leo & Ofshe, The Consequences of False Confessions, supra note 14, at 462-63
(describing the case of Gary Gauger who gave a false “hypothetical confession” to killing
his parents and was later exonerated); see also Coerced Confessions—Why Innocent People
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IV. PROPOSED REFORMS: CHALLENGING DECEPTIVE INTERROGATION
TECHNIQUES AS A MEANS OF REDUCING FALSE CONFESSIONS &
WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS
In this part, I propose that courts and legislatures reconsider the wide
latitude afforded interrogation techniques based on misrepresentations of
evidence. My reasons for this proposal are: first, as discussed in the
previous section, empirical studies and real-life wrongful conviction cases
have demonstrated that false evidence ploys are likely to produce false
confessions; second, as discussed, infra, in a criminal justice system whose
purported goal is divining the truth, it is bad public policy to permit law
enforcement officers to try to ascertain the truth by lying to suspects.
A. Truth-Seeking Function of American Criminal Justice System
Countless court cases, articles and books have set forth the goals of the
American criminal justice system, and in particular, our adversarial system
of justice. One central tenet of the system is that it is designed not to
achieve a prosecution at all costs, but rather to unearth the truth about the
culpability of a defendant. 240 If “truth-seeking” is at the heart of our
adversarial system of justice, then the question arises whether the official

Admit to Murder, (ABC News television broadcast Mar. 17, 2002) (stating that Gauger
confessed after police told him that they had independent evidence linking him to the crime
and that he must have “blacked out” and done it unknowingly); Kassin & Gudjonsson, The
Psychology of Confessions, supra note 159, at 56; Leo & Ofshe, The Consequences of False
Confessions, supra note 14, at 463-64 (describing the case of Edgar Garrett, who falsely
confessed to murdering his daughter after police convinced him he did so).
240. See William J. Brennan, Jr., The Criminal Prosecution: Sporting Event or Quest
For Truth? A Progress Report, 68 WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 17 (1990) (citing the “internal function
of [a criminal trial’s] truth-finding” in arguing for liberal discovery rules in criminal cases);
see id. at 18 (“Procedural rules ought be designed to maximize the chance that the outcome
of the trial will be a verdict that is based on what truly occurred.”); Angela J. Davis,
Prosecution and Race: The Power and Privilege of Discretion, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 13, 5152 (1998) (describing the prosecutor’s “dual role as an advocate for the government and as
an administrator of justice”); see also Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281 (1999)
(recognizing the “special role played by the American prosecutor in the search for truth in
criminal trials); Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 166 (1980); Bennett L. Gershman, Misuse
of Scientific Evidence By Prosecutors, 28 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 17, 18 (2003) (“If a
prosecutor uses the evidence responsibly, the verdict is trusted and the public’s confidence
in the adjudicative process is enhanced.”); Gershman, supra, at 19 (“The prosecutor’s role
as a ‘minister of justice’ includes preeminently a duty to seek the truth.”); Dan Conley in
PROSECUTOR
16,
available
at
http://www.ndaaProfile,
39
THE
apri.org/ndaa/profile/dan_conley_jan_feb_2005.html (quoting Boston district attorney Dan
Conley as saying, “Our job (as prosecutors) is not simply to make arrests and preserve
convictions at all costs. Our job is to seek the truth and achieve justice . . . There is nothing
more critical to the integrity of the criminal justice system than to look at the evidence, no
matter when it comes, and follow the facts and the law.”).
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use of deception and falsehood should play any role in developing the
prosecution’s case. 241
First, as recognized in Cayward and Patton, courts’ acceptance and thus
sanction of the use of trickery during interrogations creates a risk that
trickery will bleed into other parts of criminal prosecutions. This is a
significant risk even despite deeply rooted and recently affirmed precedent
requiring honesty and fair-dealing in criminal prosecutions. 242 The
Cayward case may represent the outer fringe of the use of false evidence in
interrogations, but the principles enunciated therein are by no means
limited to cases in which forged documents are presented to the suspect.
The Florida appeals court which decided Cayward cited at least three major
concerns which prompted it to draw the line of police trickery at the
fabrication of documents: 1) that the manufacturing of documents offends
“our traditional notions of due process;” 243 2) that false reports might be
preserved indefinitely and may inadvertently be introduced into the court
record; 244 and 3) that approval of the concoction of evidence reports would
create a slippery slope which might lead to the fabrication of other official
documents such as warrants, orders, lab reports, and judgments. 245
None of these concerns are limited to the forgery of documents. In fact
there is no principled distinction between a fake document and an officer’s
oral report to a suspect that he has failed a polygraph examination, which is
a commonly used technique for eliciting confessions. 246 Both sorts of
official misrepresentation offend traditional notions of due process.
Forgery and oral misrepresentation differ from one another only in degree
rather that in kind. False reports may be preserved indefinitely and

241. Even some of Miranda’s harshest critics base their criticism on the decision’s
purported thwarting of the truth-seeking function of the criminal justice system by
protecting the guilty from the consequences of their truthful confessions. See, e.g., Paul G.
Cassell, A Tribute to Joe Grano: He Kept the Flame Alive, 46 WAYNE L. REV. 1215, 1216
(2000); see also Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 707 (1993) (O’Connor, J., dissenting
in part).
242. See, e.g., Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 701-03, 705 (2004); Kyles v. Whitley, 514
U.S. 419, 432-38, 441 (1995) (discussing prosecutorial misconduct); Brady v. Maryland,
373 U.S. 83, 88 (1963) (requiring prosecutors to turn over to the defense any exculpatory
information in its possession); Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269-72 (1959) (prohibiting
prosecutors from knowingly using perjured evidence).
243. State v. Cayward, 552 So. 2d 971, 974 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
244. Id.
245. Id. at 975.
246. Kassin & Gudjonsson, The Psychology of Confession Evidence, supra note 159, at
57 (“It is important to note that as a historical matter, the polygraph has played a key role in
the interrogation tactic of presenting false evidence. The polygraph is best known for its use
as a lie-detector test, but because polygraph evidence is not admissible in most courts, police
use it primarily to induce suspects to confess.”).
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introduced into the court record, presenting a risk when a law enforcement
officer tells a suspect, for example, that he has failed a polygraph and that
representation is recorded on tape or transcribed and later presented in the
case record. There may be no documentation of the fact that the suspect
did not in fact fail the polygraph, but there may very well remain
documentation of the officer’s report that he did fail. 247
Thus, the same risk of an official lie becoming a part of the court record
results from an oral misrepresentation as from a forged document. In fact,
a counterargument to the court’s analysis in Cayward is that it may be
easier to discern whether a tangible item such as a document is forged than
it is to determine in the absence of some documentation whether an oral
representation was simply a misunderstanding, deliberately misleading, or
an outright lie. Finally, there is no reason to believe that drawing the line at
a forged evidence report will be a bulwark against the forgery of other
official documents. 248 If our courts tolerate, and sanction as constitutional,
law enforcement trickery as long as it is not reduced to paper, then
applying the same logic as the Cayward court applied, there is nothing
stopping police from fabricating information about any number of official
transactions and events.
Moreover, there is no clear basis for
distinguishing deception by police when interrogating suspects, from
deception by prosecutors when presenting evidence in court, a practice
which courts have long held to offend the Constitution. 249 Again, there is
little justification for drawing the line at false documents which have been
proven no more damaging to criminal cases and to confidence in our
criminal justice system than other forms of deception employed routinely
by those who are sworn to protect and uphold the law. 250

247. See also State v. Patton, 826 A.2d 783, 794, 798-99 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 2003) (discussing
the risks in using fabricated audio-taped evidence during interrogation which, in this case,
included the prosecution’s use of the fabricated evidence at trial to satisfy its burden that the
confession was voluntary and which prejudiced the jury by exposing it to otherwise
inadmissible prior bad act hearsay evidence).
248. Id.
249. See supra note 242 and accompanying text. Relatedly, interrogating officers should
apprise prosecutors when they employ false evidence ploys and other deceptive
interrogation techniques to elicit incriminating statements. Prosecutors should be aware of
the circumstances begetting confession evidence before deciding whether to rely on such
evidence in pursuing prosecutions.
250. See, e.g., Aaron M. Clemens, Removing the Market for Lying Snitches: Reforms to
Prevent Unjust Convictions, 23 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 151, 190-191 (2004) (criticizing law
enforcement’s use of imaginary informants in drug cases and discussing other legally
sanctioned forms of police trickery).
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B. Recommendations
In light of the scientific findings and actual wrongful conviction cases
demonstrating that false evidence ploys and other forms of law
enforcement trickery produce false confessions, 251 and in light of the fact
that allowing police to lie to suspects undermines our justice system’s
reliance on truth to discover the truth, courts and lawmakers should outlaw
the deliberate deception of suspects by police. 252 The following are a few
recommendations toward this end.
First, legislators should pass statutes outlawing law enforcement
misrepresentations about incriminating evidence during interrogations and
limiting the use of trickery during custodial questioning generally. 253 At a
minimum, these laws should prohibit police from misrepresenting the
presence or strength of forensic evidence against a suspect. They should
also outlaw police misrepresentations about statements of alleged
accomplices or eyewitnesses incriminating the suspect. In addition, these
statutes should circumscribe police from outrightly misleading a suspect
about the purposes of the interrogation; for example, indicating that he is a
witness instead of a suspect. Statutes should also require police to alert
prosecutors to their use of deceptive interrogation techniques in any given
case. This requirement will give prosecutors an opportunity to evaluate the
incriminating evidence in a complete light. Prosecutors should, in turn, be
required to provide notice to defense counsel that police misled the
defendant about critical evidence before he confessed. Defense counsel
ought to then challenge the admissibility of the confession as recommended
more fully below.
In light of the ample evidence that false law enforcement claims about
the availability and nature of incriminating evidence induce false

251. See Leo & Ofshe, Consequences of False Confessions, supra note 14, at 491-92
This article has documented that American police continue to elicit false
confessions even though the era of third degree interrogation has passed . . . For
those concerned with the proper administration of justice, the important issue is no
longer whether contemporary interrogation methods cause innocent suspects to
confess. Nor is it to speculate about the rate of police-induced false confession or
the annual number of wrongful convictions they cause. Rather, the important
question is: How can such errors be prevented?
252. See id. at 493 (“False confessions threaten the quality of criminal justice in America
by inflicting significant and unnecessary harms on the innocent.”).
253. See White, Confessions in Capital Cases, supra note 158, at 982-83, 992-93
(relating several reforms of interrogation techniques that the Governor’s Commission on
Capital Punishment recommended, including heightened judicial scrutiny of interrogation
tactics that mislead the suspect as to the strength of the evidence against him or the
likelihood of his guilt “in order to determine whether this tactic would be likely to induce an
involuntary or untrustworthy confession”).
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confessions and consequently wrongful convictions, legislators need not
wait until a high-profile exoneration takes place in their state.254 Rather,
every state should establish Innocence Commissions to examine the
prevalence of factors known to lead to wrongful convictions—including
false confessions—nationwide, and to establish reforms aimed at
preventing conviction of the innocent.
Recognizing, however, that events in particular cases often spur criminal
justice reform, the following recommendations are aimed at defense
counsel representing clients in cases in which confession evidence plays a
central role. These recommendations are particularly important in cases
where there is little, or weak, independent evidence corroborating the
confession. The recommendations are aimed at exposing both false
confessions and the factors that induce people to incriminate themselves in
crimes they did not commit. As more examples of false confessions
induced by false evidence ploys and other deceptive interrogation tactics
come to light, legislators and their constituents will likely be more willing
to advocate for reform circumscribing such techniques. 255
Defense lawyers ought to routinely ask their clients who make custodial
incriminating statements whether police made any representations that
evidence linked them to the crime. If it turns out that police did make such
representations and that the purported evidence did not exist, defense
counsel should argue that the confession is per se inadmissible. 256 Even if
trial courts are constrained by the precedent holding that trickery in
interrogation is constitutional, the issue will be preserved for presentation
on direct appeal and post-conviction where state and federal courts may
reconsider the parameters of what kind of law enforcement deception
warrants per se suppression of confessions and what deceptive techniques
are constitutionally permissible.
As early as practically possible after a suspect has been arrested, defense
counsel should seek discovery of any independent evidence corroborating
her client’s statements to police.
Defense counsel should then
independently assess whether the physical evidence, other witness
statements, or any other reliable piece of information establishes the
254. Of the 154 DNA exonerations, at least thirty-six have involved false confessions. Email from Huy Dao, Case Director, The Innocence Project at Benjamin N. Cardozo School
of Law (Jan. 12, 2005) (on file with author).
255. In order to respond effectively to anticipated protests by police groups that false
evidence ploys and other deceptive tactics are necessary to catch the guilty and that they
rarely ensnare the innocent, advocates for reform will have to carefully develop case-related
examples of false confessions wrought by the tactics they seek to circumscribe. These
recommendations are aimed at developing such examples.
256. See State v. Patton, 826 A.2d 783, 802-03 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 2003).
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veracity of any part of the client’s incriminating statement. 257 When in
doubt, counsel should employ the services of a psychologist or other false
confession expert who possesses the skills to objectively evaluate the
reliability of the confession. At the same time, counsel should move for
discovery of interrogation manuals and practices employed by the
prosecuting law enforcement agency. Counsel should determine whether
these include instructions on using false evidence ploys to induce a
confession and then move to allow expert testimony at trial about the extent
to which such interrogation methods undermine the reliability of
confessions. The production of such manuals will both assist counsel and
the retained confession expert in assessing what techniques were used in
the defendant’s interrogation, and provide a basis for suppression hearings,
jury instructions, and other proceedings related to the reliability of the
confession.
In cases in which the confession is the only evidence against the
defendant, and there is no independent physical or other reliable evidence
of guilt, defense counsel should move for dismissal of the case altogether.
Given the revelations brought to light by DNA and other exonerations that
confession evidence is often unreliable and the basis for wrongful
convictions, 258 no criminal prosecution should proceed on the basis of the
defendant’s uncorroborated self-incriminating statement alone.259
In cases in which a confession is the principal evidence against the
defendant and there is some credible indication that deceptive interrogation
tactics were used, defense counsel should also move for full suppression
hearings to cross-examine officers about the deceptive interrogation tactics
employed. During such hearings, the defendant and other witnesses make a
record of the falsehoods police told the suspect before he confessed, and
experts testify about the coercive effects of the deceptive interrogation

257. Leo & Ofshe, The Consequences of False Confessions, supra note 14, at 495
(discussing the need . . .[t]o carefully scrutinize and evaluate a suspect’s post-admission
narrative against the known facts of the crime” and warning that, “In investigations in which
hard evidence linking a person to a crime is missing, only the analysis of the suspect’s postadmission narrative provides a basis for objectively assessing his personal knowledge of a
crime.”).
258. See supra note 254 and accompanying text (citing Innocence Project statistics on
false confessions).
259. See Leo & Ofshe, Consequences of False Confessions, supra note 14, at 495 (“It
bears emphasizing that in none of the disputed confessions documented in this article was
there any reliable evidence corroborating the defendant’s confession . . . absent the
uncorroborated and unreliable statement, none of these individuals would likely have been
arrested, charged, convicted, incarcerated, or executed.”). The Inbau Manual acknowledges
that confessions lacking independent corroborating evidence “should be viewed
suspiciously.” INBAU MANUAL, supra note 92, at 437.
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techniques on the suspect. 260 Trial courts should in turn insist on some
independent evidence before admitting a confession into evidence. 261
In addition, counsel should move for jury instructions apprising the jury
that they may consider the circumstances of the confession, including
whether the defendant was misled about the nature or strength of evidence
linking him to the crime and accord the incriminating statements less
weight if they find that they were influenced by law enforcement
falsehoods. Such instructions will encourage the jury to place the
confession into its proper context and give it the appropriate weight,
particularly if there is little or no other evidence linking the defendant to
the crime. As with the suppression motion, moving for the instruction
preserves the issue for appellate and post-conviction review even if the
motion is denied.
Attorneys should challenge the validity of confessions begotten by
trickery on appeal as well as in post-conviction proceedings. As reviewing
courts learn more about the impact of the practice and the ways in which it
undermines the reliability of and confidence in the evidence used to
convict, it may encourage judges to circumscribe the use of deceptive
techniques. Courts hearing such challenges should establish bright-line
exclusionary rules prohibiting the use of false evidence during
interrogations. Such rules would automatically render inadmissible
statements derived from intentionally false representations by law
enforcement about such matters as the presence or strength of forensic
evidence, incriminating statements by eyewitnesses or alleged accomplices,
and whether the defendant was led to believe that he was being questioned
merely as a witness rather than as a suspect.262
Civil remedies should also be pursued when exonerations come to light
in cases involving deceptive interrogation practices that resulted in false

260. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 66-67 (2004) (discussing the
circumstances of the witness’s interrogation, which included “leading questions” by police
officers and noting that it was “imperative” that she be cross examined in order to allow the
jury to assess her statements’ truth).
261. See Leo & Ofshe, Consequences of False Confessions, supra note 14, at 495
(recommending that “courts insist on minimal indicia of reliability before admitting
confession statements into evidence”).
262. See State v. Patton, 826 A.2d 783, 804 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 2003). But see Godsey, supra
note 31, at 536-37 (arguing that psychological interrogation techniques are “intangible”
violations and should not be considered “objective penalties” warranting the suppression of
a confession); id. at 537 (“Extending the category of penalties to include changes in mood or
feelings caused by psychological pressure would create the same type of ambiguity and
subjectivity that haunts the due process involuntary confession rule. Psychological pressures
should, therefore, not be considered penalties. Pressures of this type are better suited for
regulation under the due process clauses.”).
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confessions. The Fourth Circuit has recently affirmed, in a Section 1983
case, a Virginia district court’s denial of qualified immunity to a police
officer who is alleged to have fabricated evidence which purportedly
showed that a rape and murder suspect provided police with independent
evidence of the crime unknown to the public.263 The plaintiff alleged that
the officer and his colleague fed him, a mentally impaired man, relevant
facts and then transcribed his answers to create his “confession.” 264 The
Fourth Circuit held that the district court fairly concluded that the
plaintiff—the exonerated man—had alleged facts amounting to a
deprivation of a constitutional right which was clearly established at the
time of the plaintiff’s conviction, namely the right not to be convicted
pursuant to a fabricated police report of his confession. 265
The
interrogation tactics in the Fourth Circuit case were not so much trickery of
the suspect as much as they were misrepresentation of the circumstances of
the confession, but the case opens the door for other exonerated people to
sue when their convictions have been based on police chicanery during
interrogations. If officers are deprived of immunity when their standard
interrogation techniques deprive the innocent of liberty, then police
departments may become more motivated to reevaluate interrogation
tactics that most often result in false confessions.
Legislators should also pass laws circumscribing criminal prosecutions
in at least the most serious of cases, rape and murder, where there is no
independent, reliable evidence other than the suspect’s own incriminating
statements. 266 (As noted above, police should be required to disclose to
prosecutors cases in which deceptive interrogation tactics result in
confessions.) This proposal is not unlike the Illinois Commission’s
recommendation that prosecutions based solely on the uncorroborated
testimony of a single eyewitness, accomplice, or jailhouse snitch, be
ineligible for capital punishment. 267
Videotaping interrogations is another widely recommended reform
which, if performed correctly, not only protects the right of the accused by

263. See Washington v. Wilmore, 407 F.3d 274, 281-83 (4th Cir. 2005).
264. See id. at 277.
265. See id. at 283.
266. See Leo & Ofshe, Consequences of False Confessions, supra note 14, at 495
(recommending that “police are trained to seek both independent evidence of a suspect’s
guilt and internal corroboration for every confession before making an arrest,” and that
“state’s attorneys demand that ‘I did it’ statements be corroborated by the details of a
suspect’s post-admission narrative before undertaking a prosecution”).
267. See FORMER ILL. GOVERNOR RYAN’S COMM’N ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, REPORT,
RECOMMENDATION
158
(2002),
available
at
http://idoc.state.il.us/ccp/ccp/reports/index.html’.
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providing an objective account of the interrogation, but also insulates
police from frivolous claims that a confession has been coerced. 268 In
Illinois, the videotaping of interrogations is being phased into practice
pursuant to legislation recommended by Governor George Ryan’s
commission recommending reforms designed to reduce the likelihood of
wrongful conviction. 269 Videotaping is also required in a number of other
jurisdictions. 270 Lawmakers in other states should also adopt the practice,
especially in homicide cases. 271
In short, it is high time to do away with the long tradition of the use of
deception to trick suspects into confessing. The demonstrated correlation
between police deception during interrogation and false confessions
leading to wrongful convictions should inspire timely judicial and
legislative reform.
CONCLUSION
At the core of the American justice system is the reliance on actual,
268. See Kassin, Does Innocence Put Innocents at Risk?, supra note 29, at 225.
269. See Steve Mills & Maurice Possley, Will Taping Interrogations Fix the System? Law
Requires Police to Record Questioning, and Some Hope it Prevents False Confession, THE
CHI. TRIB., June 21, 2005 at A1 (reporting that as of July 2005, state law will require police
across Illinois to videotape interrogations in all homicide investigations; under the new law
a confession will be presumed inadmissible as evidence if the police interrogation leading
up to it is not videotaped, with exceptions available if the suspect chooses not to be
videotaped or if video equipment is unavailable). For a detailed report on law enforcement
experiences with videotaping interrogations, see, for example, Thomas P. Sullivan, POLICE
EXPERIENCES WITH RECORDING CUSTODIAL INTERROGATIONS, A SPECIAL REPORT
PRESENTED BY THE NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW’S CENTER ON WRONGFUL
CONVICTIONS (2004) (reporting on the experiences of 238 law enforcement agencies in
thirty-eight states which videotape interrogations and concluding, “Recordings benefit
suspects, law enforcement, prosecutors, juries, trial and reviewing court judges, and the
search for truth in our justice system. The time has come for standard police practice
throughout the United States to include the use of devices to record the entire interrogation
of suspects in custody in all major felony investigations.”). Recently, the Wisconsin
Supreme Court held that police must electronically record all interrogations of juvenile
suspects. See In re Jerrell C.J., 699 N.W.2d 110, 120-21 (Wis. 2005). The case which
prompted the reform involved a fourteen-year-old boy accused of armed robbery. Id. at
113. Police handcuffed him to a wall and left him alone for two hours before questioning
him without counsel for five hours. Id. at 113, 114. Eventually, he confessed to
participating in the robbery. Id. at 114.
270. See Kassin, Does Innocence Put Innocents at Risk?, supra note 29, at 225 (noting
that Minnesota, Alaska, Illinois, and Maine have mandatory videotaping requirements,
recommending that videotaping be adopted widely, and describing the protocols most likely
to produce a neutral view of the interrogation); see also Leo & Ofshe, Consequences of
False Confessions, supra note 14, at 494.
271. See White, Confessions in Capital Cases, supra note 158, at 990 (citing Samuel R.
Gross, The Risks of Death: Why Erroneous Convictions Are Common in Capital Cases, 44
BUFF. L. REV. 469, 485 (1996)).
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legally obtained evidence to discern the truth about a crime and to convict
the guilty. In principle, the law is designed to increase confidence in the
administration of justice and to insure that the guilty are convicted with
legally obtained evidence and the innocent go free.
In the era preceding the advent of DNA exonerations and other
conclusive proof of wrongful convictions, it was generally accepted by
police and by courts that standard police interrogation practices, including
the routine deception of suspects about significant matters related to their
interrogation, did not induce false confessions. On the basis of this
presumption, courts have consistently held that police may use lies,
trickery, and various forms of deception when interrogating suspects.
In recent years, however, ever-increasing numbers of wrongful
convictions have exposed the practical fallout of such deceptive
interrogation practices.
Wrongful convictions have provided an
opportunity to closely examine the factors which cause the innocent to
confess to serious crimes. As the case studies and empirical data outlined
in this article demonstrate, interrogators’ deception of suspects concerning
critical issues such as the purpose of the interrogation and the strength or
availability of incriminating physical or testimonial evidence, often leads
the innocent to miscalculate the risks or costs of admitting involvement in a
crime. These studies effectively counter the leading interrogation manual’s
insistence that standard interrogation techniques never cause the innocent
to confess.
In light of the growing catalogue of cases involving demonstrably false
confessions as well as empirical data correlating deceptive interrogation
techniques with false confessions, courts and lawmakers should seize the
opportunity to reevaluate their acceptance of deliberate law enforcement
misrepresentation and to realign interrogation practices with the justice
system’s principled reliance on truth. Minimal safeguards include: per se
exclusion of confessions made after police have misrepresented the
availability or strength of physical or testimonial evidence; the
establishment of innocence commissions to examine the factors, including
deceptive interrogation techniques, contributing to false confessions; the
enactment of laws proscribing police from misrepresenting during
interrogations the nature or availability of evidence against suspects; and
the enactment of laws requiring police to disclose to prosecutors, and
prosecutors to disclose to defense counsel, instances in which a suspect
confessed only after the police employed deceptive interrogation tactics. In
addition, prosecutors should be prohibited from prosecuting cases in which
the only incriminating evidence is a confession following police
misrepresentation of evidence or misleading about the purpose of the
interrogation. Finally, defense attorneys have an obligation to challenge
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the admissibility of confessions wrought by deceptive interrogation tactics,
and to provide data before trial, at trial, and on appeal of the coercive
effects of deceptive police interrogation practices.
The notion that protection of the innocent is paramount to a credible
criminal justice system is universally recognized. The recommendations
herein—reforms designed to limit the use of deceptive interrogation
techniques and challenges to confessions elicited via such techniques—will
go a long way toward protecting the innocent, reducing the risks of false
confessions, and shoring up the reliability of our justice system.

